A recent analysis published by the private geopolitical firm STRATFOR made some interesting observations concerning the relative continuity between the foreign policy approaches of former President George W. Bush and current President Barack Obama.

Noting Vice President Joe Biden’s speech at the Munich Security Conference, Dr. George Friedman writes, “Most conference attendees were looking forward to a dramatic shift in U.S. foreign policy under the Obama administration. What was interesting about Biden’s speech was how little change there has been in the U.S. position and how much the attendees and the media were cheered by it.”  

Friedman then begins to argue his point by focusing on Iran. President Obama has said repeatedly that he would hold direct talks with Iran, but only if Iran stopped its pursuit of nuclear weapons and stopped its state support for terrorism. The similarity with Bush resides in the fact that the former president also said he would be willing to engage Iran, as long as the same demands made now by Obama were met. Iran has repeatedly said that it is not seeking a nuclear weapons capability, and that talks must occur before there can be any give-and-take. As Friedman notes, “Apart from the emphasis on a willingness to talk, the terms Biden laid out for such talks are identical to the terms under the Bush administration.”  

Moving on to Russia, Friedman notes that Obama has not ruled the expansion of NATO, long a source of tension between Russia and the United States, and has not agreed to stop Bush’s plan to deploy ballistic missile defense assets to Central Europe. Friedman concludes, “In short, the American position on Russia hasn’t changed, and neither has the Russian position. The similarities between Bush and Obama on Russian policy, though, go beyond the two aspects mentioned by Friedman. Obama recognizes, as did Bush, that Russia is attempting to reassert itself as a global player. High oil prices funded a Russian resurgence into the Caucasus, and Russia is once again extending its influence into Central Asia and Latin America. Obama realizes, as did Bush, that Russia must be watched carefully, and held in check when and where possible.

In addressing the United States’ relationship with Europe, Friedman seizes upon Biden’s call for more NATO help in Afghanistan. One of Obama’s signature campaign pledges was a promise to work with our European allies to get more NATO troops involved in the fight against al Qaeda and Taliban remnants. However, the new President is meeting some of the same resistance encountered by his predecessor, with Germany already saying more troops are not on the table at this time, Canada proceeding with plans to withdraw its forces in 2011, the Netherlands preparing to do the same by the end of 2009, and France entertaining the idea of more forces, but not in combat roles. Given the United States’ continued commitment to combat operations in Afghanistan (including an Iraq-style “surge”), and NATO’s internal disagreement over involvement in Afghanistan, Friedman says, “… it is unclear whether NATO can continue to function.” Indeed, not only is NATO  failing the test in Afghanistan, President Obama is finding out that the differences between the United States and Europe run far deeper than who is sitting in the Oval Office.

Friedman and STRATFOR seem struck by the continuity from Bush to Obama, saying “…Biden offered no new initiatives beyond expressing a willingness to talk, without indicating any policy shifts regarding the things that have blocked talks. Willingness to talk with the Iranians, the Russians, the Europeans and others shifts the atmospherics — allowing the listener to think things have changed — but does not address the question of what is to be discussed and what is to be offered and accepted.” I, for one, am not surprised at what is happening. In fact, foreign policy seldom changes radically from one president to the next, and the continuation of at least some, if not many, Bush policies was often hinted at by candidate Obama.

Friedman captures an essential driver of U.S. foreign policy when he says, “Ultimately, the issues dividing the world are not…subject to personalities, nor does goodwill (or bad will, for that matter) address the fundamental questions. Iran has strategic and ideological reasons for behaving the way it does. So does Russia. So does Germany, and so on. The tensions that exist between those countries and the United States might be mildly exacerbated by personalities, but nations are driven by interest, not personality.”

Campaign rhetoric aside, the realities of the Presidency have dictated to Mr. Obama the need to continue some of the very policies he previously assailed. This is not a bad thing. The President’s decisions to continue renditions, to allow the operation of short-term overseas CIA detention facilities, and to abandon a firm commitment to a 16-month withdrawal from Iraq, just to add a few more to the policies already listed, indicate that he is cognizant of the complexities of the international environment and that he is aware that, in the end, U.S. national interests, and not the interests of a particular subset of American society,  are the ultimate drivers of our foreign policy.