The United States and its European allies have tried for years to negotiate with Iran in an effort to resolve questions concerning Tehran’s suspected pursuit of nuclear weapons. Thus far, those efforts have yielded no progress, and it appears that the patience of some key players is quickly wearing thin. Shortly after his inauguration, President Barack Obama stated that he wanted to see significant progress in diplomatically solving the Iranian nuclear issue by the end of his first year in office. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu followed that statement up with one of his own, offering Iran a similar timeline for resolving the impasse. Then, just a few days ago on July 5, Vice President Joe Biden said on ABC’s “This Week with George Stephanopoulos that Israel was a sovereign nation free to take any action it deemed necessary to protect its national interests. There was a time, not that long ago, when I thought an Israeli attack against Iran’s nuclear facilities was improbable. Now I’m not so sure.

Of course, broad statements alone aren’t enough to suspect that attack plans are in the works. There are, however, other reasons to believe that the day of reckoning for Tehran’s nuclear program is drawing near. Iran continues to add centrifuges for producing highly enriched uranium, with thousands now in operation. At the same time, Tehran is working to perfect a long-range missile capability that could accurately deliver a nuclear warhead to a target. Some analysts believe Iran could be a nuclear-armed regional power as soon as 2011. Such a development would be a game changer in the Middle East, neutralizing the deterrent effect of Israel’s own nuclear arsenal and potentially sparking an arms race in which Saudi Arabia, Egypt and other states pursue their own nuclear weapons capability to counter growing Iranian power.

How would an Israeli attack unfold? Given that the United States would be unlikely to agree to over flight of Iraq for a military strike on Iran, Israel could transit Saudi Arabian airspace enroute to targets in Natanz, Esfahan, and Arak. Mossad chief Meir Dagan alluded to as much when he reportedly told Netanyahu recently that Riyadh would look the other way if Israeli aircraft flew over the Kingdom in the process of attacking Iranian nuclear facilities. Such a move would also not require U.S. consent. Israeli pilots have been training for quite some time for an attack on Iran, and air strikes would probably be accompanied by long-range missile attacks. A strong and sustained attack could be expected to inflict significant damage on Iranian nuclear facilities, but the blow would not be a lethal one. Iran has gone to great lengths to disperse, bury and protect its nuclear infrastructure, and while Tehran’s nuclear program would most certainly be set back, it would not be eliminated.

Israel is capable of conducting an effective attack, and neither the United States nor anyone else could do anything to stop it. The real concern is the potential aftermath. If history is any guide, the international community, under the auspices of the United Nations, would probably not do much. Arab states, and most likely some of America’s allies, would demand punitive sanctions, although the final product would undoubtedly be another meaningless Security Council resolution that is not enforced by anyone of any significance. Such was the case when Israel attacked Iraq’s Osirak reactor in 1981, and in 2007 when Israel destroyed what is widely believed to have been a Syrian nuclear facility in the making. There would, of course, be official condemnations from nations within and outside the Middle East. But deep down there would be a strong sense of relief, for Arab countries worried about rising Persian power, and for Western nations who have failed on their own to deal with a defiant and belligerent Iran.

The big unknown is Tehran’s reaction. Iran could step up attacks against U.S. military personnel in Iraq, or stoke sectarian strife between Iraq’s Sunnis and Shiites. Hezbollah could also be prodded, with its tens of thousands of rockets, to attack Israeli cities from southern Lebanon, or Iran could funnel arms and money to insurgent forces in Afghanistan. Iran might launch its own long-range missiles at Israel, or it might have its operatives conduct worldwide terrorist attacks against Israeli and Western soft targets like embassies and private businesses. All of these are possibilities, and all must be taken into account before Israel decides to strike. The determining factor will be whether or not Israel believes the benefits of an attack outweigh the potential risks of an Iranian response. I suspect we’ll find out the answer soon enough.

By Greg C. Reeson

When Israel agreed to the cease-fire agreement that ended the Second Lebanon War in 2006, it suffered a strategic defeat that the Israeli government now has a chance to correct. The ongoing operations against Hamas in the Gaza Strip offer an opportunity not only to restore the pre-2006 balance of power in the immediate region, but also to establish conditions conducive to a lasting Israeli-Palestinian peace deal.

At the outset of the 2006 summer war with Hezbollah, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert laid out specific conditions that would have to be met before Israel would agree to end the fighting. Those non-negotiable conditions included the release of two Israeli soldiers captured by Hezbollah, Ehud Goldwasser and Eldad Regev, and the elimination of Hezbollah’s capability for launching rockets into Israel. Olmert promised that all-out war on Hezbollah would continue until Israel’s demands were met. Not only were the conditions not satisfied at the time of the cease-fire agreement, but Hezbollah survived the war with an intact command structure and a still very lethal ability to strike Israel at will. Hezbollah fought the IDF to a stalemate on the battlefield, shattering the myth of Israeli invincibility that had permeated Arab societies for decades and emboldening other terrorist groups such as Hamas that were hell bent on the destruction of the Jewish State.

The reasons for Israel’s failure in 2006 have been widely debated since the conflict ended. But whether it was tougher-than-expected resistance, an aversion to large numbers of Israeli casualties, a weak government struggling to find its way after losing Ariel Sharon to a massive stroke, or an inadequate war plan that relied too heavily on air power is, in the end, irrelevant. When all was said and done, Israel, which had fought to a draw on the ground, had been defeated in a strategic sense: for the first time Israel had not defeated an Arab opponent, and the Arab world took notice. The current fight with Hamas in Gaza can change the geopolitical reality that has existed in the Middle East for the past two years.

When Israel pulled its troops and settlements out of Gaza in 2005, it did so after years of being advised that the occupation was the reason for the violence. End the occupation, the assertion went, and the violence against Israel would stop. Except it didn’t. Over the past three years, Gaza has become nothing short of a safe haven for terrorists eager to attack Israel. In 2006, Hamas operatives entered Israel and kidnapped an Israeli soldier, Corporal Gilad Shalit, who continues to be held somewhere in the Gaza Strip. Since the withdrawal, rockets have continued to pummel Israeli cities and it has become increasingly clear that the idea of trading land for peace has failed.

After being struck by hundreds of Hamas rockets fired from Gaza in just the past year, it appears that the Israeli government has finally decided that it has had enough. Defense Minister Ehud Barak has promised, as Prime Minister Olmert did two and a half years ago in the conflict with Hezbollah, an all-out war designed to eradicate the threat from Hamas militants. Air and naval strikes have inflicted serious losses on Hamas, and Israeli troops and tanks are massing along the border in preparation for a ground operation that, while potentially very costly, is probably necessary if the threat from Hamas is to be truly eliminated.

Now is not the time for weakness or indecisiveness by the Israeli government. There is an opportunity in Gaza to restore the credibility of Israel’s defense forces, shift the balance of power back in Israel’s favor, and pave the way for a lasting agreement with the Palestinians by getting rid of the main obstacle to peace: Hamas. The rejection of a recently proposed 48-hour cease-fire was without a doubt the right decision for Israel and for the region. Hamas will not be persuaded through diplomacy or dialogue to stop its attacks on Israel. But Hamas can be beaten into submission through an unrelenting military campaign designed to protect Israeli citizens and punish terrorists while fostering the conditions for future negotiations with moderate Palestinians willing to accept Israel’s existence.

Operation Cast Lead should be carried out fully and decisively, without hesitation and without reservation. Hamas could and would claim as a victory any premature cessation of hostilities that left intact the group’s ability to strike Israel with rockets or other means. Will Israel take advantage of this moment to do what it could not or would not do in the 2006 war with Hezbollah? Time will tell. But this is clearly an opportunity for fundamental change that should not be squandered.