The United States and its European allies have tried for years to negotiate with Iran in an effort to resolve questions concerning Tehran’s suspected pursuit of nuclear weapons. Thus far, those efforts have yielded no progress, and it appears that the patience of some key players is quickly wearing thin. Shortly after his inauguration, President Barack Obama stated that he wanted to see significant progress in diplomatically solving the Iranian nuclear issue by the end of his first year in office. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu followed that statement up with one of his own, offering Iran a similar timeline for resolving the impasse. Then, just a few days ago on July 5, Vice President Joe Biden said on ABC’s “This Week with George Stephanopoulos that Israel was a sovereign nation free to take any action it deemed necessary to protect its national interests. There was a time, not that long ago, when I thought an Israeli attack against Iran’s nuclear facilities was improbable. Now I’m not so sure.

Of course, broad statements alone aren’t enough to suspect that attack plans are in the works. There are, however, other reasons to believe that the day of reckoning for Tehran’s nuclear program is drawing near. Iran continues to add centrifuges for producing highly enriched uranium, with thousands now in operation. At the same time, Tehran is working to perfect a long-range missile capability that could accurately deliver a nuclear warhead to a target. Some analysts believe Iran could be a nuclear-armed regional power as soon as 2011. Such a development would be a game changer in the Middle East, neutralizing the deterrent effect of Israel’s own nuclear arsenal and potentially sparking an arms race in which Saudi Arabia, Egypt and other states pursue their own nuclear weapons capability to counter growing Iranian power.

How would an Israeli attack unfold? Given that the United States would be unlikely to agree to over flight of Iraq for a military strike on Iran, Israel could transit Saudi Arabian airspace enroute to targets in Natanz, Esfahan, and Arak. Mossad chief Meir Dagan alluded to as much when he reportedly told Netanyahu recently that Riyadh would look the other way if Israeli aircraft flew over the Kingdom in the process of attacking Iranian nuclear facilities. Such a move would also not require U.S. consent. Israeli pilots have been training for quite some time for an attack on Iran, and air strikes would probably be accompanied by long-range missile attacks. A strong and sustained attack could be expected to inflict significant damage on Iranian nuclear facilities, but the blow would not be a lethal one. Iran has gone to great lengths to disperse, bury and protect its nuclear infrastructure, and while Tehran’s nuclear program would most certainly be set back, it would not be eliminated.

Israel is capable of conducting an effective attack, and neither the United States nor anyone else could do anything to stop it. The real concern is the potential aftermath. If history is any guide, the international community, under the auspices of the United Nations, would probably not do much. Arab states, and most likely some of America’s allies, would demand punitive sanctions, although the final product would undoubtedly be another meaningless Security Council resolution that is not enforced by anyone of any significance. Such was the case when Israel attacked Iraq’s Osirak reactor in 1981, and in 2007 when Israel destroyed what is widely believed to have been a Syrian nuclear facility in the making. There would, of course, be official condemnations from nations within and outside the Middle East. But deep down there would be a strong sense of relief, for Arab countries worried about rising Persian power, and for Western nations who have failed on their own to deal with a defiant and belligerent Iran.

The big unknown is Tehran’s reaction. Iran could step up attacks against U.S. military personnel in Iraq, or stoke sectarian strife between Iraq’s Sunnis and Shiites. Hezbollah could also be prodded, with its tens of thousands of rockets, to attack Israeli cities from southern Lebanon, or Iran could funnel arms and money to insurgent forces in Afghanistan. Iran might launch its own long-range missiles at Israel, or it might have its operatives conduct worldwide terrorist attacks against Israeli and Western soft targets like embassies and private businesses. All of these are possibilities, and all must be taken into account before Israel decides to strike. The determining factor will be whether or not Israel believes the benefits of an attack outweigh the potential risks of an Iranian response. I suspect we’ll find out the answer soon enough.

Any hope that the result of last week’s presidential election in Iran might be overturned is now, more than likely, gone. More than 200 of the 290 members of Iran’s parliament have endorsed the victory of incumbent President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has declared that there were no irregularities in the vote. Protestors and opposition leaders have been warned that they will be held accountable for creating “chaos” if street protests against the government continue, and the Iranian government appears to be making good on that pledge. Truth be told, though, as far as U.S. interests are concerned, it didn’t matter at all who won or even if, as many suspect, the election was stolen from former Prime Minister and opposition candidate Mir Hossain Mousavi.

Speaking to the cable news network CNBC shortly after the Iranian election, President Barack Obama said, “Either way, we are going to be dealing with an Iranian regime that has historically been hostile to the United States, that has caused some problems in the neighborhood and is pursuing nuclear weapons. And so we’ve got long term interests in having them not weaponize nuclear power and stop funding organizations like Hezbollah and Hamas. And that would be true whoever came out on top in this election.”

The President, who has been severely criticized for taking this position, is basically correct. The Iranian President is irrelevant as far as U.S. foreign policy is concerned. Ahmadinejad may have, with the help of the clerical regime that runs Iran, stolen the election. Then again he may not have. Ahmadinejad is very popular with large segments of Iran’s population. The nearly two-thirds of the vote he received in the election mirrors the limited, although suspect, polling numbers available prior to votes being cast, and is very close to the 62 percent he received when first elected in 2005. There are, of course, legitimate reasons for concern about the integrity of the electoral process, but outright fraud on a scale large enough to steal the election by such a significant margin is tough to prove.

Either way it doesn’t matter. Each of the four candidates running for president was hand-picked from a pool of nearly 500 applicants by the Guardian Council, an unelected body of clerics that, along with the Supreme Leader, wields the real power in Iran. Each of the candidates, including Mousavi, supported Iran’s quest for nuclear technology. Mousavi may have proved to be less confrontational and less problematic than Ahmadinejad, but that, in the grand scheme of things, is unimportant. The president in Iran is subordinate to the Supreme Leader. It is Khamenei who is calling the shots and who has the final word on foreign policy, state support for terrorism, national security, and the nuclear program. The important thing to take away from Iran’s presidential election is that the contest between Ahmadinejad and Mousavi, or more precisely the response to Iranian citizens demonstrating against the regime, exposed Iran for what it is: a brutal, theocratic dictatorship that is more interested in maintaining an exclusive hold on power than it is in moving Iran forward.

In the months and years to come, the United States will have to figure out what to do about Iran’s activities in the Middle East. The oppression of the Iranian people is important, in the long-term. But in the short-term, the United States must be more focused on Iran’s continued support of terrorism through its proxies Hezbollah and Hamas, the continued funding, arming, and training by Tehran of militia forces in Iraq and insurgent forces in Afghanistan, and Iran’s ongoing defiance of the international community over its suspected nuclear weapons acquisition efforts. Demonstrations of support for opponents of Iran’s clerical regime are justified and proper, and in keeping with traditional American values. But right now it is more critical for the United States to keep its eye on the ball and to focus its efforts on those issues that currently affect, or could potentially affect in the future, American national security.

Just as Supreme Leader Khamenei offered no concessions to the hundreds of thousands of protestors on the streets in cities throughout Iran, he will offer no concessions to us. That has been made abundantly clear, despite President Obama’s repeated overtures for dialogue and compromise. Keeping diplomatic channels open is appropriate, but no option should be taken off the table. It’s time to stop dilly dallying around with Tehran and get serious. There is no greater destabilizing force in the region, and the international community has got to take tougher action. Only strong, truly international measures that inflict serious pain on Iran are likely to have an effect. Tough sanctions enforced by the United States and some European allies are not all that tough when countries like Russia and China ignore them. Military force may be necessary at some point, and the world should prepare for that possibility. The aftermath of the presidential election in Iran put on display for all the word to see the brutal nature of the Iranian regime. It remains to be seen, though, if world is up to the task of dealing with the Iranian problem once and for all.

President Obama’s June 4 speech to the Islamic world, given in Cairo, Egypt, caused me to think about the new U.S. focus on Israeli settlements. What follows is just a simple observation based on the President’s speech and my brief thinking session. In his speech, President Obama called upon Israel to halt not only the development of new settlements, but also to stop the natural growth of existing settlements. Of course, this demand by the President is not something new. The United States has expressed its reservations about Israeli settlements for many years, but Israel has rarely been pressed on the matter. This is a tough issue for Israel, and one that has the potential to seriously damage U.S. – Israeli relations.

Israel, at least under Benjamin Netanyahu, is not about to concede completely on settlements. While Netanyahu has agreed to freeze the building of new settlements, he is unlikely to prevent the natural growth of existing settlements that is necessary to accommodate typical family growth.

This is dangerous ground for the U.S. – Israeli alliance. Israel is no longer as dependent on the United States as it has been in past years, and the Jewish State currently enjoys a position of relative strength in the Middle East. None if its neighbors are able to seriously threaten Israel’s survival, at least for now. Hezbollah and Hamas take their shots, of course, but neither is going to bring about the destruction of Israel. Lebanon is too weak and fractured to pose a real challenge, and Egypt, Jordan, and Syria are militarily incapable of winning a war against the IDF. The greatest threat to Israel right now is Iran, and there are indications that Washington and Jerusalem are growing apart when it comes to the best approach for dealing with Tehran’s nuclear weapons program. Israel may feel compelled to act without consulting with the United States if it feels Iran’s nuclear program reaches a critical point. Additionally, Israel is not nearly as dependent on U.S. aid as in the past, with financial assistance to Jerusalem, measured as a percentage of GDP, a fraction of what it used to be.

I don’t believe for a minute that Israel would abstain from action against Iran just because the United States does not want it to. Quite the contrary, given Israel’s current position in the region, I believe Israel will act in what it believes to be its best interests regardless of what the United States thinks.

The United States has chosen to focus on settlements in its relationship with Israel instead of focusing on Iran or regional terrorism. The current administration believes that resolution of the settlement issue can provide an opening to an accommodation that might lead to a two-state peace deal. But Israel is concerned with greater issues that it feels directly threaten its national security.

It may not seem like a big deal to the casual observer, but disagreement on what is important to Israel has the potential to cause a serious rift in U.S.-Israeli relations, one that could take many years to repair.

The United States is in the early stages of a concerted effort to salvage the war in Afghanistan. A new commander has been charged with executing a fresh strategy, the number of U.S. military personnel committed to the fight is set to nearly double, air strikes by unmanned drones have expanded in frequency and scope, the training of Afghan security forces has been accelerated, and the way has been paved for a possible peace deal with the Taliban. Recently, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen declared that the U.S. has two years to turn the deteriorating situation around. It doesn’t take much imagination to believe that the United States is setting itself up for a wholesale withdrawal from Afghanistan if the salvage effort fails.

The problems in Afghanistan are numerous, and they are complex. The central government is corrupt and incapable of extending its authority outside of the capital, Kabul. The country’s infrastructure has essentially been destroyed by decades of war. The Afghan security forces are ill-equipped, ill-trained, and insufficient in number to have an appreciable impact for several more years. The NATO alliance is divided, short of manpower, and restricted by national caveats that prevent the military forces of many European nations from conducting combat operations. A porous border region allows insurgents, terrorists and criminal elements to conduct attacks within Afghanistan and then retreat to Pakistan with near impunity. Finally, the Taliban, easily removed from power by the United States in October 2001, has regained the momentum and is taking control of increasing swathes of territory while slowly building support among some segments of the Afghan population. No matter how you look at it, the United States and its NATO allies, while not necessarily losing the war, are clearly not winning it.

It is into this environment that the United States is surging troops, much like President Bush’s effort in Iraq in 2007 and 2008. But Afghanistan is not Iraq, and those looking for an Iraqi-style change in the Afghan security environment are likely to be disappointed. Afghanistan has no civil society or sense of nationalism comparable to that which existed in Iraq. The primary enemy force, the Taliban, is religiously motivated and not interested in the mere acquisition of power. They will not be driven to the bargaining table through the use of force. Protection of the population is problematic, with the ratio of military forces in Afghanistan worse than in Iraq. Counterinsurgency 101 dictates that the security of the people is the number one priority, but the United States and its allies do not have the manpower to effectively safeguard Afghan civilians.

So what’s likely to happen over the next 18 to 24 months? U.S. forces will valiantly take the fight to the enemy, attempting to clear, hold and build in areas currently dominated by Taliban militants. American and NATO casualties will inevitably increase, perhaps sharply, as is generally the case when a military force goes on the offensive. As casualty rates go up, public support in the United States, Europe and Canada, already shaky, will drop, perhaps drastically. The surge, temporary because ongoing commitments dictate that it must be, will not change the basic metrics of the war. Public support will be at an all-time low and America’s allies will be looking for a way out, if they haven’t left already. The United States, faced with a tough choice on the best way ahead, will be able to say that it has done everything that could be done. A decade of war with no tangible results makes for a compelling case for withdrawal.

When the decision to leave Afghanistan is made, and it will be made soon, the United States will be able to redeploy its forces knowing that it has achieved its original objectives. When the U.S. entered Afghanistan nearly 8 years ago, it did so with two primary goals: defeating al Qaeda and denying the use of Afghanistan as a base of operations for Islamic terrorists with global reach. Both of these goals have already been reached. Al Qaeda as it existed on September 11, 2001 is defunct. While some command capability has been regained by a few top al Qaeda leaders hiding in the Afghanistan – Pakistan border area, bin Laden and Zawahiri are in command of nothing, forced by relentless U.S. pressure to worry more about personal survival than global jihad. The real danger posed by al Qaeda today is manifested in the multitude of regional and local affiliates that have evolved since the start of the U.S. – Afghan war. There is, of course, still a danger that Afghanistan could once again become a terrorist safe haven, but that danger exists with the same degree of likelihood in multiple places around the world. A strong focus on Pakistan, the real central front in the fight against radical Islam, would allow the United States to respond to terrorist developments in Afghanistan if there was a need to do so.

Just as in Iraq, the surge in Afghanistan will be followed by a general withdrawal of U.S. military forces. It is hard to envision a scenario though, where a residual element like the one planned for Iraq is left behind to support the central government. Afghanistan has no real strategic value for the United States, and it would be a hard sell to continue a decade-long war in which Americans were dying while bin Laden remained at-large, the Taliban refused to concede defeat, and the Afghan government continued to flounder. None of the current realities are likely to change as a result of the surge. The United States has exacted its revenge for the 9/11 attacks, and the departure from Afghanistan is likely just around the corner. The question is how many Americans will die between now the time Washington decides the war is over?

Reuters published a short analysis May 14 outlining potential scenarios that could unfold as Pakistan continues to wage war against Taliban and other Islamic radicals within its borders. While Reuters focuses on potential market effects, the real issue here is the survival of the Pakistani state. Each of the scenarios is presented below in bold type, along with personal commentary.

Scenario #1: A weak Pakistani government struggles to push back the Taliban. In this scenario Reuters hypothesizes that the current situation, which is characterized by an unpopular and divided government capable of general containment of the terrorist threat but incapable of defeating that threat, would remain unchanged for the foreseeable future. I suspect this is probably the most likely scenario. Pakistan is currently not willing or able to fully take on the threat posed by the various terrorist elements opposed to the government. However, it is doubtful that the Pakistani military would allow the Pakistani state to fail and fall into the hands of radical Islamists. The Zardari government may not survive, but the armed forces will ensure the survival of the state.

Scenario #2: A military offensive deals a significant blow to the Taliban. This scenario is highly unlikely to unfold. The Pakistani military has two major problems: focus and capability. The Pakistani military still views India as a greater threat than the Taliban and other Islamist groups. The primary focus of Pakistani military strategy remains India and the bulk of Pakistan’s forces remain oriented away from the terrorist threat and toward India. In accordance with Pakistani strategic assessments that give India a higher priority than the Taliban and other terrorist groups, Pakistan’s military forces are structured, equipped and trained for war with India and not for counterinsurgency or counterterrorist operations. Given strategic priorities and capability realities, it is doubtful that the Pakistani military would do significant damage to the Taliban and other Pakistani terrorist groups.

Scenario #3: The Taliban makes dramatic territorial gains. This scenario is also unlikely to develop. The Taliban know the dangers involved in overreaching. A weak government, a friendly state intelligence service, and a Pakistani army preoccupied with India allow Taliban elements to build public support over time and through incremental territorial gains by providing needed social services and law and order in regions plagued by chaos and violence.

Scenario #4: The Pakistani military takes power. A military coup is a very real possibility, one that I’ve written about before. It is unlikely that the military would step in to run the country if the Pakistani government maintained some semblance of control. If the survival of the state itself is threatened, however, it is well within the realm of possibilities that the world could see yet another military coup in Islamabad.

Scenario #5: A stronger Pakistani government emerges. This is an interesting scenario and one that poses a dilemma for the United States. Pakistani president Zardari does not enjoy public support, but his main opposition, former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, does. The problem with Sharif is that he has questionable ties to radical Islamist elements. Sharif could conceivably put together a stronger government that the one headed by Zardari, but does the United States stick with its current ally, or switch its support to the popular guy with questionable associations?  

http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/SP221916.htm

By Greg C. Reeson

The recent pirate attack on the Maersk Alabama off the coast of Somalia was the first such attack by pirates on a U.S.-flagged ship in more than 200 years. Shortly after the U.S. Navy rescued the ship’s captain, Richard Phillips, pirates responded by seizing three more vessels and firing on another U.S.-flagged ship, the Liberty Sun. While the attacks on U.S. ships are new, the Somali piracy problem has been going on for at least the last decade. As a result of international inaction over the years, attacks have now increased to the point where they threaten international trade and humanitarian assistance to Africa. Ignoring the pirates is not an option. They will continue their attacks until we decide to stop reacting and choose instead to go on the offensive to find a solution to the problem.

Taking the fight to the pirates first requires identifying who they are and why they do what they do. The pirates attacking cargo and fishing vessels off the coast of Somalia are not maritime terrorists, as some have suggested. They have no political purpose and no specific, predetermined civilian targets. They are, as Secretary of State Hillary Clinton recently said, common criminals who attack targets of opportunity with the goal of making a fast buck through ransom payments or the sale of captured cargo. They are the product of a failed Somali state, and until the conditions that prompt their actions are addressed, they will not go away. The problem for the United States, and the international community, is that no one seems to have the stomach for another intervention in Somalia.

If no country or group of countries is willing to undertake the massive nation-building effort that would be required to establish a functioning state in Somalia, one that would provide non-criminal opportunities for income and prosperity, then the only solution for the foreseeable future is strategic management of the piracy problem. Actions taken thus far have not worked. Patrolling the shipping lane off the Somali coast is an inefficient and ineffective use of critical naval resources. The area to be monitored is too vast for the number of ships available for patrols, and the tactics used by the pirates – moving in fast on small boats and quickly taking control of targeted ships – minimize the reaction time available to allied navies. Paying ransoms, which several shipping companies have done, has rewarded the pirates’ behavior and promoted additional attacks.

So what can be done? While there is no silver bullet or magic solution for bringing the piracy under control, there are several courses of action the United States can take, with or without assistance from other nations threatened by Somali pirates. To begin, the crews of vessels transiting the shipping lane off the coast of Somalia can be armed so that they can defend themselves against pirate attacks. Thus far shipping companies have balked at this idea because of the increased risk of harm to crew members and because of legitimate legal concerns. But relying on reactive naval support from the international community is not a practical solution, and the arming of crews with sonic cannons, water guns, and lethal small arms and crew-served weapons remains the best option for an immediate response to the piracy problem.

A second option is the use of contracted security personnel. This no doubt would be a controversial course of action, given the allegations made against private security contractors in Iraq, but shipping companies could bear the cost of protection for commercial cargo and receive assistance from the United States, or other participating nations, for humanitarian shipments sent to Africa by foreign governments. Another possibility is the use of a convoy system like that used to escort allied supply ships during World War II. At a minimum, the United States could maximize the use of its naval forces in the region by grouping multiple cargo ships together under the protection of the U.S. Navy. Ideally, other nations would participate in a convoy system, guaranteeing safe passage for ships involved in international trade. Those shipping companies declining to participate because of business worries concerning speed of transport and loss of control and flexibility would be responsible for their own safety and security. Finally, the United States and other willing nations could target the assets and safe havens used by the pirates in the planning and execution of their attacks. That means hitting the docks where they moor their boats, destroying their “mother ships” and attack craft, and taking out the facilities where they live, primarily in the Puntland region and especially in the “pirate city” of Eyl.

None of these measures, employed either individually or in concert with other measures, will completely eliminate the piracy problem. As long as Somalia remains an ungoverned space, and as long as the international community remains reluctant to bring that ungoverned space under control, the conditions that motivate the pirates will continue to produce armed thugs that seek out weak targets in the waters off the Somali coast. But the absence of a final resolution to the problem is not an excuse for continued inaction, especially when the lives of Americans are at stake. To protect U.S.-flagged ships and American crews, and to ensure the unimpeded flow of humanitarian aid and international trade, the United States must take immediate action to reduce the problem of Somali piracy to a manageable level.

For years the international community has tried to persuade Iran to abandon its nuclear program with no success. As Mark Fitzpatrick of the International Institute for Strategic Studies put it, “There’s a fundamental impasse between the western demand for no enrichment and the Iranian demand to continue enrichment. There’s no obvious compromise between those two positions.”

In 2009 we are in the same position we were in when international pressure on Iran first started in earnest in 2003. Six years of talking has led to nothing but six years of continued nuclear progress by Iran. But really, what choice do we really have? The United Nations Security Council will never authorize truly meaningful economic sanctions against Iran as long as Russia and China insist on putting national financial interests before the effort to stop Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Unilateral sanctions efforts by the United States and the European Union haven’t had any appreciable effect, and thus far there doesn’t appear to be any substantive support for cutting off Iran’s gasoline imports, a move that would have a crippling effect on Iran’s economy.

A military strike by the United States isn’t a viable option. The potential consequences in the region far outweigh any potential benefits, given the difficulties involved in attacking dispersed nuclear facilities protected by advanced surface to air defense systems and the likely retaliatory strikes conducted through proxies like Hezbollah and various Iraqi militias. Even the Israelis are unlikely to undertake such an effort, despite increasingly bellicose rhetoric from Israeli officials and warnings of a potential Israeli strike by U.S. Central Command head General David Petraeus.

There appears to be very little that the United States and its allies are willing or able to do stop Iran’s nuclear program. According to the Times, asked last month if the Obama administration was considering a compromise position allowing Iran to have a limited uranium enrichment capability but not nuclear weapons, State Department spokesman Robert Wood said, “I don’t know…Let’s let the review be completed and then we can spell out our policies.”

And there we have the outlines of the way ahead with respect to Iran. Unable or unwilling to act, the international community and the United States are preparing to resign themselves to the reality of an Iran armed with a uranium enrichment capability. But having the capability to produce nuclear weapons and actually producing nuclear weapons that can be delivered to a target are two entirely different matters. If attainment of a uranium enrichment capability cannot be prevented, the task will then become one of preventing Iran from using that capability for the purpose of attaining nuclear weapons.

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3028ceae-20b1-11de-b930-00144feabdc0.html

By Greg C. Reeson

It appears that public support for the war in Afghanistan is beginning to suffer from the “Iraq effect.” I use the term to describe a shift in public opinion when a military operation does not go as planned and U.S. casualties increase as a result. This, of course, is not a new idea, but Iraq serves as the most recent high-profile example of a conflict in which public opinion shifted from very high support to very low support during the course of the operation.

 Immediately after the U.S.-led effort to topple the government of Saddam Hussein in early 2003, public support for the Iraq war stood at more than 70 percent. As the insurgency began to heat up in late 2003 and early 2004, however, and as U.S. casualties began to rise, that support began a steady decline that has only begun to rebound in the last few months, more than two years after President Bush ordered a surge of American forces to Baghdad and al-Anbar Province.

Now, with the situation in Afghanistan continuing to deteriorate, and with U.S. casualties there continuing to increase, support for the war, which stood at nearly 90 percent in November 2001, has hit a new low in the latest USAToday / Gallup poll. Nearly half of all respondents believe the United States made a mistake when it deployed its military forces to Afghanistan, and the number who believe the war is going well has fallen to less than 40 percent.

Support for the war has steadily eroded. According to USAToday, the number of respondents who think military action in Afghanistan was a mistake is up 12 percent in just the last month. As the number of attacks continues to increase, and as more American military forces are put into harm’s way as a result of planned force increases in Afghanistan, the number of U.S. killed and wounded will continue to rise, and public support will undoubtedly continue to decline.

The news isn’t any better for one of the United States’ most reliable allies. An Associated Press story from March 17 reported that 60 percent of Britons are unconvinced of the need to keep British military forces in Afghanistan. Barely a third of respondents to a BBC-commissioned ComRes poll said they were “fairly” or “very convinced” by the British government’s case for staying in the war.

This could pose a problem for the U.S. war effort against Taliban and al Qaeda fighters. The road ahead promises to be a long one and casualties are likely to increase, perhaps heavily, over the next couple of years. As President Obama attempts to find a solution to what he has referred to as the “right” war, he will need the support of both America’s allies and the American people.