In the January 11^th edition of The New York Times, published the morning after President Bush announced his new “surge” strategy for Iraq, Sheryl Gay Stolberg wrote the following passage: “By stepping up the American military presence in Iraq, President Bush is not only inviting an epic clash with the Democrats who run Capitol Hill. He is ignoring the results of the November elections, rejecting the central thrust of the bipartisan Iraq Study Group and flouting the advice of some of his own generals, as well as Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki of Iraq.”

I put this passage at the beginning of this article because it forces me to ask a simple question, a question that should have a simple answer: Who is the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. armed forces? The obvious answer is, of course, the President of the United States.

But given the number of vocal critics of the President’s new strategy, the speculation about how to stop it from being implemented and the calls for adoption of strategies recommended by other individuals or groups, I can’t help but wonder if I somehow missed something in all those American government classes I took during my school years.

In her article, Ms. Stolberg writes that Democrats complained the President’s consultation with Congress was perfunctory. What they fail to understand here is that there is no advice and consent role when it comes to the President’s duties as Commander-in-Chief. Article II, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution says “The President shall be commander in chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several states, when called into the actual service of the United States.”

The advice and consent clause, written into the same article and section of the Constitution, covers treaties and the nominations of “…ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United States….” At no time does it mention the role of the legislative branch with regard to the leadership of our armed forces.

Yet, despite the clear responsibilities of the President as Commander-in-Chief spelled out by this nation’s Founding Fathers, the Democrats on Capitol Hill want to usurp Mr. Bush’s authority as provided for by the Constitution. Of course, any Commander-in-Chief would be wise to listen to as many opinions as possible when the decision to be made involves the lives of our nation’s most precious resource, our youth. But ultimately the decision belongs to the President alone.

To write a passage such as the one put forth by Ms. Stolberg is to present opinion as fact. The war on Iraq was not on the ballot last November, although it is correct to say that many voters are unhappy with the progress we are making on that front. The election was more an expression of discontent with a number of factors, of which the war was but one, than it was a referendum solely on the war itself. The Iraq Study Group’s recommendations were discounted by virtually everyone with an understanding of what is happening in Iraq, including many Democrats. And Prime Minister al-Maliki is an ineffective leader who lacks the support not only of Americans, but of Iraqis as well.

President Bush is the Commander-in-Chief of a military at war. He is not looking for a graceful exit from a bad situation. He is looking for victory. Whether his strategy will work or not remains to be seen. But ultimately, whether we succeed or fail, the decision about how to proceed is his. If the strategy proves him correct, and we end up with a stable, democratically elected government in the Middle East, history will vindicate him. If the strategy proves to be wrong, there will be no else to blame.

The President's New Iraq Strategy Is Rooted In Six Fundamental Elements:

1. Let the Iraqis lead;
2. Help Iraqis protect the population;
3. Isolate extremists;
4. Create space for political progress;
5. Diversify political and economic efforts; and
6. Situate the strategy in a regional approach.

• Iraq Could Not Be Graver – The War On Terror Cannot Be Won If We Fail In Iraq.  Our enemies throughout the Middle East are trying to defeat us in Iraq.  If we step back now, the problems in Iraq will become more lethal, and make our troops fight an uglier battle than we are seeing today.

Key Elements Of The New Approach: Security

Iraqi:

• Publicly acknowledge all parties are responsible for quelling sectarian violence.
• Work with additional Coalition help to regain control of the capital and protect the Iraqi population.
• Deliver necessary Iraqi forces for Baghdad and protect those forces from political interference.
• Commit to intensify efforts to build balanced security forces throughout the nation that provide security even-handedly for all Iraqis.
• Plan and fund eventual demobilization program for militias.

Coalition:

• Agree that helping Iraqis to provide population security is necessary to enable accelerated transition and political progress.
• Provide additional military and civilian resources to accomplish this mission.
• Increase efforts to support tribes willing to help Iraqis fight Al Qaeda in Anbar.
• Accelerate and expand the embed program while minimizing risk to participants.

Both Coalition And Iraqi:

• Continue counter-terror operations against Al Qaeda and insurgent organizations.
• Take more vigorous action against death squad networks.
• Accelerate transition to Iraqi responsibility and increase Iraqi ownership.
• Increase Iraqi security force capacity – both size and effectiveness – from 10 to 13 Army divisions, 36 to 41 Army Brigades, and 112 to 132 Army Battalions.
  • Establish a National Operations Center, National Counterterrorism Force, and National Strike Force.
  • Reform the Ministry of Interior to increase transparency and accountability and transform the National Police.

Key Elements Of The New Approach: Political

Iraqi:

• The Government of Iraq commits to:
  • Reform its cabinet to provide even-handed service delivery.
  • Act on promised reconciliation initiatives (oil law, de-Baathification law, Provincial elections).
  • Give Coalition and ISF authority to pursue ALL extremists.

• All Iraqi leaders support reconciliation.
• Moderate coalition emerges as strong base of support for unity government.

Coalition:

• Support political moderates so they can take on the extremists.
  • Build and sustain strategic partnerships with moderate Shi'a, Sunnis, and Kurds.
• Support the national compact and key elements of reconciliation with Iraqis in the lead.
• Diversify U.S. efforts to foster political accommodation outside Baghdad (more flexibility for local commanders and civilian leaders).
  • Expand and increase the flexibility of the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) footprint.
  • Focus U.S. political, security, and economic resources at local level to open space for moderates, with initial priority to Baghdad and Anbar.

Both Coalition And Iraqi:

• Partnership between Prime Minister Maliki, Iraqi moderates, and the United States where all parties are clear on expectations and responsibilities.
• Strengthen the rule of law and combat corruption.
• Build on security gains to foster local and national political accommodations.
• Make Iraqi institutions even-handed, serving all of Iraq's communities on an impartial basis.

Key Elements Of The New Approach: Economic

Iraqi:

• Deliver economic resources and provide essential services to all areas and communities.
• Enact hydrocarbons law to promote investment, national unity, and reconciliation.
• Capitalize and execute jobs-producing programs.
• Match U.S. efforts to create jobs with longer term sustainable Iraqi programs.
• Focus more economic effort on relatively secure areas as a magnet for employment and growth.

Coalition:

• Refocus efforts to help Iraqis build capacity in areas vital to success of the government (e.g. budget execution, key ministries).
• Decentralize efforts to build Iraqi capacities outside the Green Zone.
  • Double the number of PRTs and civilians serving outside the Green Zone.
  • Establish PRT-capability within maneuver Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs).

• Greater integration of economic strategy with military effort.
  • Joint civil-military plans devised by PRT and BCT.
  • Remove legal and bureaucratic barriers to maximize cooperation and flexibility.

Key Elements Of The New Approach: Regional

Iraqi:

• Vigorously engage Arab states.
• Take the lead in establishing a regional forum to give support and help from the neighborhood.
• Counter negative foreign activity in Iraq.
• Increase efforts to counter PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party).

Coalition:

• Intensify efforts to counter Iranian and Syrian influence inside Iraq.
• Increase military presence in the region.
• Strengthen defense ties with partner states in the region.
• Encourage Arab state support to Government of Iraq.
• Continue efforts to help manage relations between Iraq and Turkey.
• Continue to seek the region's full support in the War on Terror.

Both Coalition And Iraqi:

• Focus on the International Compact.
• Retain active U.N. engagement in Iraq – particularly for election support and constitutional review. 

With all the recent reports about the President’s soon-to-be-unveiled Iraq troop surge strategy, there has been much speculation about exactly what a surge would like, with estimates ranging anywhere from 10,000 to 50,000 additional soldiers. To get an idea of where the President might be heading, we should examine a recent proposal by American Enterprise Institute Resident Scholar Frederick Kagan.

“Choosing Victory: A Plan for Success in Iraq” was unveiled on December 15, 2006 as a recommended course of action for establishing security and bringing about peace and stability in the war-ravaged country. The plan rightly discounts the notion of a rapid withdrawal, warning that failure in Iraq would likely lead to the following consequences: widespread regional conflict; humanitarian catastrophe; terrorist sanctuaries; further radicalization of the Muslim world; loss of American credibility globally; and damage to the morale of the U.S. military. The plan also notes that the current strategy is not working, and that the violence is escalating faster than we are training Iraqis to control it.

Written by Kagan, retired Generals Jack Keane and David Barno, and several other contributors, “Choosing Victory” has as its basic argument that security must be established first, before any forward progress, economic or political, can be made in Iraq. To provide the security that the plan calls for, Kagan proposes an increase in the number of U.S. combat troops for a period of between 18 and 24 months. The surge would consist of over 30,000 combat soldiers and marines, plus the required support elements needed to sustain their operations.

The first, and most obvious question, is where will the troops come from? Kagan’s plan proposes extending the Iraq rotations for Army Brigade Combat Teams to 15 months, and extending the Marine Corps’ Regimental Combat Team tours to 12 months. The accelerated deployment of four combat brigades, along with the tour extensions for units already scheduled for deployment, would allow the U.S. military to put an additional four to five brigades in Baghdad (the center of gravity, according to the plan), doubling the size of the U.S. force currently there. At the same time, an additional two Marine Regimental Combat Teams would be deployed to the volatile al-Anbar Province, providing extra security in that Sunni insurgent hot spot.

“Choosing Victory” would deploy the first wave of forces by March 2007, with preparations for offensive security operations lasting until June. Then the surge in forces would allow U.S. commanders to go on the offensive, securing Baghdad by the fall of 2007. Once neighborhoods within Baghdad have been secured, U.S. forces would hand over security for the cleared areas to Iraqi soldiers and police. Simultaneously, the plan says, a massive reconstruction effort should be undertaken to provide a significant improvement in the quality of life of cleared sectors.

It is an ambitious plan, to say the least, and one which has thus far been met with much criticism. The American public has demonstrated of late that it does not have the stomach for this fight, an attitude that Kagan says must be changed. He calls for a national commitment to the war, with both the military and the public understanding that deployments will be longer and that National Guard units may return to the fight sooner than expected, a fight that will see increased casualties as we step up the effort to secure Baghdad.

All indications are that President Bush is leaning considerably toward a strategy that will be very similar to Kagan’s plan. But the mood of the nation is not on the side of Kagan or the President. No matter how well he presents his strategy, President Bush will not find the support that he needs and that “Choosing Victory” calls for. The result will be a serious confrontation between the Executive and Legislative branches, testing our system of government and our national resolve. Who will win? I don’t know. But I can tell you who will lose: the men and women of our armed forces who continue to valiantly serve their nation in a vicious environment while the citizens and leaders of this great country try to figure out what to do next.

By Greg C. Reeson

No sooner had the grainy cell phone video of Saddam Hussein’s execution been broadcast across on the Internet than angry mobs began to fill the streets of Iraq, protesting not only the hurried nature of the act, but the manner in which it was conducted. Both objections are crucial to understanding the reality of Iraq today, a reality that was made glaringly obvious by the scene in Saddam’s death chamber: sectarian divides have widened to a point where the idea of a unified Iraq with a representative government is no longer realistic.

Since the “coalition of the willing” first invaded Iraq in 2003, the constant focus has been on establishing a single nation with a democratically elected government that could serve as a model of reform and progress throughout the Middle East. Iraqis who braved insurgent attacks to go to the polls elected a national leadership representative of the country’s Shiite majority, and the Shia have made no effort to conceal their animosity for the Sunni minority that oppressed them for nearly three decades.

After Saddam was captured and brought to trial for crimes against the Iraqi people, Shiites in Iraq’s government replaced the presiding judge because he was deemed too lenient. After the conviction and subsequent sentence of death, government officials in Baghdad began to say the execution could happen by the end of the year. Despite demands from the United States that Saddam be afforded due process under the law, the Shiite government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki rushed Hussein to the gallows in what could only be described as a mob lynching caught on tape.

Now I’m not saying Saddam should not have been executed. Perhaps more than anyone in history he deserved to die for his regime’s murder of hundreds of thousands of Iraqis during his twenty-four years as head of state. But the timing and manner of the proceedings did more to damage Iraq’s chances for survival as a unified nation than any incident since the bombing of the Golden Dome Mosque in Samarra in 2004.

First, let’s discuss the timing. Saddam was executed just days after an Iraqi appeals court upheld his death sentence and on a day that Sunnis begin celebrating the Feast of the Sacrifice, a Muslim festival known as Eid al-Ahda. Iraqi law prohibits executions on Muslim holidays and the move was interpreted as an affront to Iraq’s Sunni minority.

An even larger issue than the timing, though, is the conduct of the execution itself. Images of Saddam being taunted by a mob of Shiite henchmen with shouts of “Moqtada,” “Moqtada,” a reference to radical Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, prompted protests in Sunni areas of Iraq and sparked outrage throughout the Sunni-dominated Middle East. In Samarra, Sunnis broke into the Golden Dome Mosque carrying a mock coffin and photos of Saddam Hussein. The choice of the Golden Dome was a deliberate one. It was the bombing of this mosque by Sunni insurgents that led to the ongoing sectarian violence that is tearing Iraq apart today.

Which brings us back to the premise of this article. Both the timing and the conduct of Saddam’s execution were meant as a message from the Shiite majority to the Sunni minority: we are in charge now and there is nothing you can do about it. Shiites are consolidating their power and retaliating for decades of abuse at the hands of Saddam Hussein’s Sunni regime.

The International Herald Tribune recently wrote the following: “Not one of the Iraqi officials who discussed the sequence of events was able to explain why Maliki had been unwilling to allow the execution to wait until it could be better organized. Nor would any explain why those who conducted it had allowed it to deteriorate into a sectarian free-for-all that had the effect, on the video recordings, of making Saddam, a mass murderer, appear a pillar of dignity and restraint, and his executioners, representing Shiites who were his principal victims, seem like bullying street thugs.”

The explanation is simple, and it is the reason that a unified Iraq is doomed to failure. The Shia are not truly interested in national reconciliation. They have control of Iraq and they do not intend to relinquish any of their newly acquired power. The timing and conduct of the execution, along with the airing of video images of Hussein’s final moments, are deliberate actions by the Shiite majority that will undoubtedly increase sectarian violence and destroy any chance of preserving an Iraqi nation.

Even before the rise of the post-Saddam government in Iraq, Sunni leaders in Egypt and Jordan warned of a “Shiite Crescent,” a zone of influence and power by Islam’s second largest branch that stretched across the Middle East from Beirut to Tehran. The push for Shiite dominance, which has been led by an increasingly bold and defiant regime in Iran, is making Sunni Arabs in the region gradually more nervous, and with good reason.

Shiites, who represent less than twenty percent of all the world’s Muslims, have long been subject to Sunni dominated regimes throughout most of the Middle East. Prior to the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, Iran was the only country with a Shiite majority population and a Shiite-led government. With the toppling of Saddam Hussein’s Sunni minority dictatorship, Iraq (which is sixty percent Shiite) is now led, albeit tenuously, by a Shiite-dominated unity government that, when combined with an aggressive regional power play by Iran, has emboldened Shiites in Sunni-led countries.

Iran’s Shiite regime has been fomenting unrest in Iraq since the very beginning of the war in early 2003. Wielding significant influence among Iraq’s Shia in the south, Iran has provided weapons, fighters, and training for militias conducting attacks against coalition forces and Sunni insurgents. Iran’s hand can be felt in everything in Iraq from the explosive materials contained in IEDs to the sectarian violence waged by private militaries like Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr’s Mehdi Army. The ultimate goal, of course, is to forge an Iraq that is at best completely dominated by Iran, or at worst openly friendly toward Iraq’s former foe.

In Bahrain, which is seventy percent Shiite, a Sunni minority regime has been increasingly under fire from a discontented populace demanding better living conditions and increased representation in government. Iran has close ties to Shiites throughout the region and regularly uses its influence to inflame Shiite passions when it suits Tehran’s needs. The Shiites in Bahrain have witnessed the events unfolding in Iraq and are now moving to make their voices heard.

In Lebanon, which is governed by a coalition of Sunnis, Shiites, and Christians, Hezbollah is leading massive protests that demand Shiite power equivalent to their proportion of the population (with about a third of the population, the Shia are the largest single group in Lebanon). Emboldened by a remarkable performance against the Israeli military during the most recent conflict last summer, Iranian sponsored Hezbollah is waging a proxy war against the Jewish State while increasing its popularity among Lebanon’s Shiites.

And while some include Syria in the Shiite Crescent, Assad’s dictatorship is actually Alawite, a sect of Islam that promotes pan-Arabism and is not ideologically aligned with the Shia. Still, Syria is openly allied with the clerics in Iran and serves as a launch pad for Iranian arms and fighters headed for Lebanon.

With Iranian influence spreading throughout the Middle East, countries like Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan, all with strong Shiite minorities, are becoming increasingly nervous at the prospect of rising Shiite power in a region traditionally dominated by Sunni Arabs. They fear tensions with their own Shiite populations and some, like Saudi Arabia, have openly hinted that intervention in Iraq on behalf of Sunnis is a realistic possibility to stop the spread of Iranian influence.

Iran, in its quest to become the most powerful nation in the Middle East, has led the push for increased Shiite influence throughout the region. Shiites in Bahrain and Lebanon have watched the consolidation of power in Iraq and begun to assert themselves politically against governments that are not representative of their populations. Sunnis are nervous, and rightfully so. If Iran succeeds in acquiring a nuclear weapon, the fear of a Shiite Crescent will be eclipsed by the reality of a Shiite dominance of the Middle East that will persevere for generations.

By Greg C. Reeson

It was fascinating to see the mainstream media’s obsession with the death toll in Iraq as the “grim milestone” of 3,000 U.S. soldiers killed in the war approached toward the end of the year. It was a macabre scene, with most cable and major news networks, along with their print media peers, anxiously watching the number of casualties rise in anticipation of that momentous occasion, when they could point their fingers at President Bush and talk about how his conduct of the war in Iraq was ruining America and killing her youth.

“Time to reflect as Iraq toll hits 3,000.” “New Year Brings 3000^th US death in Iraq.” So read the headlines the last weekend of 2006, as makeshift memorials sprung up around the country and protest rallies made the evening news. Cindy Sheehan, I’m sure, is very proud. My question, though, is this: when did Americans become so averse to war casualties, and more importantly, why did it happen?

We, as a society, were not always so upset at the loss of American soldiers in combat. In World War II we absorbed some 400,000 deaths, with tens of thousands in the Battle of the Bulge (Hitler’s ill-fated Ardennes Offensive) alone and thousands in one day on the beaches of Normandy. In Korea, we suffered over 50,000 dead and in Vietnam the total was near 60,000. Both the Second World War and the Korean Conflict saw much higher casualty rates per day for a period of time roughly equivalent to the current war in Iraq.

Somewhere between the end of the Vietnam War and the end of the first year of Operation Iraqi Freedom in early 2004, we as a nation decided that we were now opposed to the casualties inherent in an extended combat environment, particularly like the one we are faced with now.

According to a recent TNS poll released by the Washington Post and ABC News, 77% of Americans believe the number of U.S. military casualties in Iraq is unacceptable. Another poll, cited in a September 2005 International Herald Tribune article, found that 45% of respondents said there had been more casualties than they expected, and that was nearly a year and a half ago. So what happened to cause this increase in the sensitivity of Americans to combat losses?

Really, it’s quite simple I think. Americans got accustomed to quick, painless victories that incurred minimal loss of life among our service members. We invaded Grenada in 1983, with only 19 casualties. Then, in 1989 we went to Panama in pursuit of Manuel Noriega with only 24 combat deaths. But the one that really changed the American mindset, the one that moved us to casualty aversion as a society, was the Persian Gulf War, or Operation Desert Storm, in 1991.

For the first time since Vietnam, the American public watched in anticipation as the U.S. military deployed more than 500,000 troops to Southwest Asia to take on Saddam Hussein and evict Iraqi forces from Kuwait. We witnessed “Nintendo” warfare as smart bombs and precision guided missiles seamlessly slipped into windows and air shafts to take out designated targets with minimal civilian and U.S. casualties. After only 100 hours the ground offensive came to a halt, with Iraq in retreat and an incredibly low 148 U.S. battle deaths, after facing what was then the fourth largest army in the world.

What has happened to our society is that we have been conditioned by our superior technology and our superpower status, both of which give us advantages over conventional enemies that simply cannot be overcome, to believe that we can just go into a country, clean up a mess, and then come home with an absolute minimum number of losses.

This Pavlovian conditioning has misled us, though. All the technology and firepower in the world will never change the fact that war is an ugly business. In combat, the brutal truth is that people, military and civilian, die. Period. There’s just no way around it. We became accustomed to easy victories against traditional armies with uniforms and front lines. When those customs of war disappeared and we were faced with an enemy who utilized cowardly anonymous attacks from roadside bombs and barbaric tactics against civilians designed to create mass casualties, we were shocked back into reality.

Now, critics will say that Americans are not really casualty averse as long as they believe in the cause we are fighting for. And the problem with Iraq is that the public doesn’t believe in it. The fact that we failed to find weapons of mass destruction took away our mandate for invading a sovereign nation, making further loss of American lives pointless.

There was a time when I subscribed to that belief myself. But now I’m not so sure. Maybe I give the American public too much credit. Maybe they don’t really understand the consequences of failure in Iraq and are therefore unwilling to pay the price for our success there.

No, I don’t think that’s the case at all. I think Americans fully understand why we should stay, but they are unwilling to suffer the costs involved. They are unwilling to accept that the American way of war is not the image they have grown accustomed to over the past thirty years. They are unwilling to accept that our soldiers engage in brutal, savage combat that sometimes leads to horrific acts that few among the public can understand.

And that is why they want our troops to come home now.

It is actually good for the American conscience that this war has unfolded the way it has. It reminds me of a well-known quote by one of America’s most famous generals, Robert E. Lee, who said, “It is well that war is so terrible—lest we should grow too fond of it.” Perhaps we as Americans will once again learn to appreciate the true costs of war, and focus not on what the latest casualty number is, but on the lives and sacrifices of the brave men and women who volunteer to fight our nation’s battles, no matter how terrible those battles may be.

The war in Iraq is going badly. That’s what the news media tell us. That’s what the Iraq Study Group said in its “bipartisan” report. Even former Senator John Edwards, who just threw his hat into the ring for President after falling into political obscurity after the 2004 election, and Democratic upstart and Presidential hopeful Barack Obama, have told us that now is the time to get out before it gets any worse. But what are our military commanders and soldiers in Iraq saying?

Most of the reports I have read, both in the mainstream media and in some nontraditional media, have all said the same thing: our commanders and soldiers say that we are making progress, but we need more time. Over the past three years, the men and women that we as a nation have trained, schooled, and selected to lead our military forces have been implementing a strategy in Iraq that is centered on training Iraqi military and police forces to take over responsibility for the security of their country.

Progress has been slow, to be sure, but progress is being made nonetheless. The situation in Iraq requires more time to establish capable security forces than may be the case in other countries because the society is so fractured along sectarian lines that deep suspicions held for generations must be overcome. The Iraqi Army and Police forces have struggled to find Iraqis committed to securing the nation more than securing the future of their particular militia or sect. Each day more and more Iraqis step forward to join the security forces. And each day Iraqis committed to fighting the insurgency are replacing those identified as contributors to the violence.

The two men principally responsible for the past few years in Iraq, Generals Abizaid and Casey, have both called for patience and resolve as more Iraqi units take the lead in security operations, with U.S. forces immediately on hand to help out, and as Iraqi units demonstrate the ability to operate independently, at which point they are handed responsibility for one of Iraq’s eighteen provinces.

As President Bush crafts his new direction for Iraq, a strategy to be announced after the New Year, coalition forces in the war-torn country continue to transfer responsibility for security to Iraqi forces. On December 20, Iraqis assumed control of security operations in An Najaf Province, the third such province this year to be released from coalition control. Previously, Iraqis took over operations in Al Muthanna Province on July 14 and in Dhi Qar Province on September 21.

Critics will claim that these three provinces were relatively peaceful to begin with and are not an indication of the ability of Iraqi forces to combat a brutal insurgency. This is absolutely true, but you have to start somewhere. Fledgling forces need to be built up, trained, and given enough experience to secure confidence in their abilities before being thrown into the fire. Attempting to hand over Baghdad or the volatile Al-Anbar Province at the outset of security transfer operations would doom the entire effort to failure. Such a move would just make no sense at all. There is a deliberate process and that process takes time.

The decision to hand over security operations to Iraqi forces is based on four criteria: the level of the threat, the competence of Iraqi security forces in a given province, the ability of the provincial government to manage security operations, and the ability of coalition forces to reinforce the Iraqi troops if necessary. Our military commanders, in consultation with Iraqi authorities, apply these criteria to Iraq’s provinces and then make decisions about how best to proceed. The process takes time and is made even more difficult because simultaneous operations against terrorists and insurgents must also be conducted.

I don’t pretend to know whether or not this strategy will work, and I dare not hazard a guess. What I believe, though, is that our military leaders are this nation’s subject matter experts when it comes to fighting and winning America’s wars. What I believe is that they would not keep our country’s sons and daughters in harm’s way unless they thought their strategy would work. While we eagerly study the Baker-Hamilton report, and examine Senator Biden’s Plan for Iraq, and entertain Senator McCain’s calls for more troops to be deployed, we should take just a minute or two to stop and listen to what our military leaders are telling us. Maybe then the President can truly examine all of our options and make a decision that is not based on public sentiment or political liability, but on the national security interests of the United States.

Almost immediately after the hanging of Saddam Hussein, media pundits and political analysts began speculating about whether or not the execution of the former Iraqi dictator would do anything to stem the sectarian violence that is ripping Iraq apart. The journalists and “experts” debating the topic, whether for or against the death penalty, all focus on the same question: will this solve anything?

Engaging in such discussion completely misses the point of the execution. Only the truly naïve in this world could believe, even for a moment, that the hanging of Saddam Hussein might somehow help bring about a national reconciliation among Iraqis or make diehard Baathists finally accept the fact that the Sunni minority will never return to power. Saddam’s death sentence was never intended to accomplish these long sought after goals. The execution was, simply put, punishment for Saddam’s crimes against the people of Iraq.

Born April 28, 1937 in the village of Ouja near the northern city of Tikrit, Saddam Hussein joined the radical Baath Party in 1957. He ultimately consolidated his hold on the group by murdering hundreds of his political opponents in 1979 after the Party had gained control of Iraq. The next year, in 1980, Saddam gave the order for Iraqi troops to invade neighboring Iran, a conflict that cost hundreds of thousands of lives and saw the use of chemical weapons by both sides.

In 1982, after a failed assassination attempt in Dujail, Saddam ordered the execution of 148 men and boys from the village. It was this crime that he was hanged for on December 30, but there were many others for which he should have forfeited his life. In 1987 Saddam launched the “Anfal” campaign against the Kurds in the north of the country, killing an estimated 180,000 Iraqis. In 1988, Hussein ordered, under the supervision of his cousin “Chemical Ali,” the use of mustard gas and nerve agents against the Kurdish town of Halabja, killing around 5,000 and maiming thousands more.

After invading Kuwait in 1990, Saddam ordered the burning of over 700 oil wells and the opening of pipelines that released 10 million barrels of oil into the Persian Gulf. The devastating effects on Iraq’s economy and the ensuing environmental disaster are acts the Iraqi people never completely recovered from. After the Gulf War, a 1991 Shiite uprising in southern Iraq was violently put down. Entire villages were bulldozed and between 30,000 and 60,000 Iraqis were killed.

Over the course of his twenty four years as the “Butcher of Baghdad,” Saddam Hussein operated notorious torture prisons, presided over a tightly controlled police state, waged ethnic cleansing campaigns to remove non-Arabs from Iraq, and ruthlessly murdered anyone brave enough to voice opposition to his policies or his authority.

Iraq has always been a powder keg just waiting to explode. The majority Shiites have always resented being subject to the minority Sunnis. The Kurds, who make up about twenty percent of the Iraqi population, have long sought independence from the government in Baghdad.

Saddam maintained order as a ruthless dictator who used his secret police and well-paid enforcers to snuff out dissent as soon as it appeared. He was reckless and irresponsible with both Iraq’s economy and its people. He murdered hundreds of thousands of his own citizens and squandered Iraq’s resources on efforts to preserve his rule. That is why Saddam was hanged. The violence in Iraq is far from over, regardless of the fate of the former dictator. But now, for the first time in nearly three decades, the people of Iraq can work toward a future without worrying about Saddam Hussein. 

When an Islamic militia first established a foothold in Somalia by capturing the capital of Mogadishu in June 2006, the United States initially withheld judgment until the intentions of the group could be determined with some certainty. While the militia rejected the label of “terrorist organization,” its actions over the next few months made it clear that Islamic extremists had taken their quest for a radical Muslim state, based entirely on Sharia, to the African nation. Now America may be faced with a new battleground in its global war on terrorism.

The United States has refused to engage in dialogue with the Supreme Islamic Courts Council (SICC) until it renounces some of its more radical positions and practices. Over the past six months there have been multiple reports out of Somalia of beheadings, stonings, and the implementation of severe restrictions on everything from music and movies to the freedoms granted women.

When the SICC continued to make advances throughout the country, the Somali interim government retreated to the town of Baidoa, with protection from the armed forces of Ethiopia. Somalia’s neighbor has repeatedly warned the SICC that it would intervene in the conflict, and that intervention has now become the reality on the ground.

This past week Ethiopian forces launched multiple air strikes against the Islamists as part of their effort to defend the interim government. Fighting continues today with each side claiming to have inflicted significant casualties on the other. This conflict has been coming for a while now, and the threat of a larger regional conflict is looming. Strategic Forecasting (STRATFOR), a private intelligence company in Austin, Texas has reported that the Islamists have made an open call for foreign fighters, both from Ethiopian adversary Eritrea and from other jihadists around the world.

If an African conflict erupts, and if Islamic extremists flock to the continent to participate in the battle for a Taliban-style Somalia, will U.S. and other western forces get involved? Any war on terror would require a response to a new haven for Islamic extremists, but the presence of American or western ground forces in Somalia is just not a realistic expectation. The United States is heavily involved in Afghanistan and Iraq and just does not have the forces available to engage in another fight in Somalia.

So what happens next? STRATFOR has speculated that the United States will increase aid and support to Ethiopian armed forces, and that is probably a safe bet. Getting someone else to do the fighting is always preferable, as long as the interests of the United States can be secured.

Another possible course of action, hypothesized by STRATFOR, is the attempted revival, by the United States, of Somali warlords. This would be dangerous ground indeed, and the likelihood of success is not very high. Warlords, by their very nature, are loyal to those who enhance their power, wealth, and prestige the most. While the SICC has been establishing alliances with the warlords over the past six months, any arrangement with the United States would necessarily be temporary and the thugs running the Somali militias know it.

I suspect Ethiopia and Eritrea will bloody each other in what will hopefully not become a larger regional conflict. Ethiopia is concerned with its borders and is not likely to support the Somali interim government to the degree necessary to eliminate the SICC as a ruling force, despite what appear to be initial battlefield successes. For the United States, other regional realities will delay the expansion of the war on terrorism to Somalia until another day. It is likely that we will have to accept the fact that Somalia will become an Islamic state under the SICC.

With the passing of the November elections, which were generally interpreted as an expression of the American public’s dissatisfaction with the war in Iraq, strategies for changing direction in the war-torn country have been offered by several individuals and groups, with the most notable being Senator Biden’s Plan for Iraq and the Baker-Hamilton panel’s Iraq Study Group report.

Throughout the seemingly endless discussions about which strategy is best, the assumption that Iraq would remain a unified country has prevailed. But given the increasing levels of sectarian violence and the continuing lack of effort on the part of Iraqis to work toward national reconciliation, let’s consider here the idea of abandoning the one-Iraq policy in favor of a true division into two newly independent states.

Opponents and Proponents

President Bush has repeatedly stated that he is opposed to any plan that provides for the division of Iraq, as has Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. Most of Iraq’s neighbors and the leaders of the Sunni-led insurgency have voiced their opposition as well, with regional states fearing a loss of their Sunni buffer with Iran and with Iraq’s former ruling minority understanding that any Sunni region they would inhabit would be devoid of oil resources and economically stagnant.

Proponents of dividing Iraq include several Shiite, Kurdish, and American lawmakers, as well as many citizens of both Iraq and the United States. The divisions proposed so far all create three largely autonomous regions with a limited national assembly that would maintain a single Iraqi state. Provisions for such regions are written into the Iraqi constitution, and Senator Biden has advocated them in his plan.

For the Kurds, the idea of an autonomous region is very appealing. They have largely governed themselves since the 1991 Gulf War and want to continue that autonomy with responsibility for their own security and oil resources. Similarly, many Shiites have pushed for the creation of their own autonomous region in Iraq’s south, where oil is abundant and the security situation is not nearly as tenuous as it is in central and western Iraq.

The Sunnis, who would control none of Iraq’s oil resources, have consistently balked at the Shiite and Kurdish proposals. Senator Biden has suggested the guarantee of about twenty percent of national oil revenues to the Sunnis as a remedy for their lack of economic means, but thus far neither the Kurds nor the Shiites have shown any interest in sharing their oil wealth with their former oppressors.

Problems With a Unified Iraq

Since the U.S.-led invasion in March 2003, the security situation in Iraq has steadily deteriorated to the point where many have begun to characterize the conflict as an all-out civil war. To get control of the continually escalating violence, coalition troops have pursued a strategy of training Iraqi Army and Police forces that will gradually take the lead in battling the insurgency so that foreign combat troops can begin to leave.

While steady strides have been made, the training strategy has taken much longer than anyone anticipated. The Iraq Study Group referred to the progress as “fitful,” and cited loyalty to sectarian ties as a major obstacle to forming security forces dedicated to a national government.

Even if the major groups could reach some sort of agreement on national goals, real accommodation is unlikely because there is no single Sunni, Shiite, or Kurdish position. The insurgency is divided among many groups, with the private intelligence company STRATFOR listing eight Sunni nationalist insurgent groups and three foreign jihadist groups. The Shia are likewise divided with at least three major militias and many smaller armed factions loyal to different clerics, crime syndicates, and other parties.

But perhaps the biggest problem is that thus far none of the major players have shown an interest in reaching an agreement on what a unified Iraq should look like. According to the Iraq Study Group, “Iraq’s leaders often claim that they do not want a division of the country, but we found that key Shia and Kurdish leaders have little commitment to national reconciliation.” So, if the current unity government isn’t working, and if the creation of three autonomous regions is unlikely to solve Iraq’s woes, perhaps a two-state division of Iraq is worth consideration.

Dividing the Country

The most stable parts of Iraq are the Kurdish north and the Shiite south. Therefore any two-state solution would necessarily focus on these geographical areas. The Kurds would control the northern oil fields and the Shia would control the southern resources. The Sunnis, refusing to work toward any solution to the conflict, would be left with two choices: learn to live peacefully as the minority population they are or face certain extermination at the hands of Shiites and Kurds if they continue to choose violence over negotiation.

Now, this looks very simplistic on the surface, and other issues such as borders and mixed cities would still have to be worked out. But a two-state solution is as viable as any other course of action proposed thus far. Critics of the idea will throw out many objections, including the concerns of neighboring countries and the need to include Iraq’s Sunni population in any agreement. These are valid concerns that must be addressed as part of any proposal for solving the violence in Iraq.

Potential Consequences

The first issue that must be addressed is the reaction of the Sunni minority. The two-state solution effectively abandons Sunnis because of their stubborn refusal to give up the insurgency and end the vicious cycle of violence. This idea has already been floated by the U.S. State Department and is simply recognition of the Sunni reluctance to join in Iraq’s future. To put it frankly, they just don’t have the numbers to fight the Shiites or the Kurds indefinitely, especially in areas where those groups could take the lead in their own security operations. The insurgency could continue, but instead of being limited to largely Sunni areas in central and western Iraq, insurgents would have to take the fight to Kurdish and Shiite dominated areas in the north and south of the country.

Neighboring Sunni countries are worried about losing their Iraqi buffer with Iran, as well as the rapid rise of Shiite power in a region largely dominated by Sunni Arab governments. Saudi Arabia has threatened open support for Iraq’s Sunnis, and Jordan may feel compelled to act as well. But the reality is that a Shiite majority would dominate any Iraqi government anyway and an Iranian-led Shiite power grab has been underway for the better part of the last year. What the Sunnis fear is already happening and further violence would only lead to complete disaster for the entire Middle East.

Any independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq would infuriate Turkey, Iran, and Syria, all fearful that the creation of a Kurdistan would stir up unrest among their own Kurdish populations. There would have to be strong U.S. assurances that a Kurdish state in northern Iraq would not seek to expand into Turkish, Iranian or Syrian territories, perhaps guaranteed by U.S. bases in the newly formed nation. Basing in Kurdistan makes the most sense for the United States because the Kurds are the most pro-American group in Iraq and would not want to jeopardize the gains they have made under the umbrella of U.S. protection. An added bonus for the United States is that Kurdish bases would provide a launching pad for countering Iranian influence in the region.

Perhaps the biggest consequence of this plan is that the United States would be accepting Iranian dominance of any Shiite state created in southern Iraq. No matter what happens from this point on, I think Iran wins. Iraq will never again be the Iranian adversary it once was. Either an Iran-friendly Shiite government will dominate the entire country or the Iranians will exert significant influence in any Shiite region or state in the south of Iraq. The goal now is to limit Iranian influence as much as possible, a goal that can be accomplished with U.S. bases in the Kurdish north and in Kuwait.

By no means is this a simple solution and there can be no doubt that tremendous difficulties would arise. It is a starting point, as are the other plans proposed thus far. Given that so many individuals and groups are opposed to the division of Iraq, this two-state solution may be way off the mark. But given the options available to the United States right now, it is a plan to consider.

Now that the media hype over the Iraq Study Group’s report is finally starting to die down a bit, attention is quickly turning to the President’s upcoming national address in which he is expected to lay out his new strategy for dealing with the ongoing insurgent and sectarian violence.

Many analysts suspect the President’s new course of action will include the continued training of Iraqi Army and police forces, a strategy that has been in place since shortly after the U.S.-led invasion in March 2003 and one that has been recommended for increased emphasis and effort by the Baker-Hamilton commission.

Of course, it is easy to understand the appeal of this approach: as Iraqi forces increase in capability and begin to take over security operations, American forces can start to leave. Iraqis gradually assume responsibility for their country while the United States slowly decreases its military footprint in a war that is increasingly unpopular with the American public. The problem with this approach, though, is that it ignores a fundamental reality in Iraq: that the issue with the Iraqi security forces is not one of training, but one of loyalty to a unified nation.

The Iraqi Army has made some measurable progress, to be sure, and has even taken the lead in security operations in some areas of the country. Every day more and more Iraqis brave the threat of insurgent and terrorist attacks to join its ranks. The training and equipping of the Army continues throughout the country, but still the prospect of a military force supportive of a national government is a distant hope under even the best of circumstances.

The ISG covered the issue of national allegiance in its report: “Significant questions remain about the ethnic composition and loyalties of some Iraqi units—specifically whether they will carry out missions on behalf of national goals instead of a sectarian agenda.” The report goes on to say, “Of Iraq’s 10 planned divisions, those that are even-numbered are made up of Iraqis who signed up to serve in a specific area, and they have been reluctant to redeploy to other areas of the country. As a result, elements of the Army have refused to carry out missions.”

The Iraqi Police suffer from the same problem, with sectarian loyalties manifesting themselves in the bribery, theft, torture and murder of the civilian population. Family ties, religious beliefs and tribal associations take precedence over protecting and serving the public at large, and many policemen use their positions to enhance their respective militias or factions instead of to enforce the laws passed by the Iraqi government.

Unless there is some sort of national reconciliation in which all parties agree to support a unified Iraqi government, all the training in the world will not matter. And the reality is that such a political arrangement not likely to be reached anytime soon. Thus far, none of the multitude of Shiite groups has shown an interest in working with the Sunnis to guarantee them a place in Iraq’s future, and the Kurds have focused their efforts on maintaining the regional autonomy they have enjoyed for nearly two decades. As a result, the Sunnis have shown no inclination to stop their campaign of violence against Shiites and coalition forces and have worked to some degree with foreign jihadists to undermine the national political process.

So the cycle of violence continues and conditions in Iraq steadily deteriorate. Thousands of Iraqis die each month and American military casualties progressively rise. The citizens of both Iraq and the United States are growing increasingly impatient with the current state of affairs as President Bush analyzes multiple recommendations for a new strategy.

If that strategy includes the continued training of Iraqi Army and police forces, as it likely will, the larger issue of national reconciliation will have to be a top priority. Unless all groups accept a unified Iraq and commit their efforts to supporting a central government, the forces that make up the Iraqi Army and police will continue to give their primary loyalty to the many factions currently struggling for power. And as long as that is the case, we are wasting our time training and equipping them as part of a strategy designed to hand over security responsibility so that we can bring our troops home.

There has been increased debate recently about whether or not the District of Columbia should have a voting member of the House of Representatives, just as each of the fifty states do. Those in favor of a voting member of the House tend to cite the “taxation without representation” argument as well as the provisions of the “Seat of Government” Clause, or “District” Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Those opposed to granting the residents of D.C. a voting member in the House generally claim that voting representatives are limited to the states by the Constitution.

Incoming Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi has expressed her support for Congressional voting rights for D.C., and it is widely expected that she will push for passage of House Resolution 5388, the D.C. Fair and Equal House Voting Rights Act. But will it pass, and more importantly, should the residents of the District of Columbia have a voting member of the House of Representatives?

Opponents of H.R. 5388 say that Article I, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution grants to states alone the power of the vote in the House. Here’s what the Constitution says: “The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second year by the people of the several states….” It goes on to say, “No person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the age of twenty-five years, and been seven years a citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an inhabitant of that state in which he shall be chosen.”

So the argument goes something like this: the Constitution is very clear in its wording, in which the STATES are represented in the House. The District of Columbia is not a state, and is therefore not entitled to a voting representative in the House. Currently, the District is represented by a delegate, Eleanor Holmes Norton, who is not allowed to vote on legislation before the House.

The problem with this set-up is that the residents of D.C. are taxpayers, are subject to the laws passed by the Congress, and are subject to compulsory military service if such service is ever enacted again. Yet, they do not have a say in the policies and laws adopted by their government. Surely the founding fathers of this nation did not envision the denial of voting rights to citizens, and they most surely did not envision the likelihood of the large residential population within the District that is present today.

So how do we fix this so that the residents of D.C. are fairly represented in the House? There are two approaches, one that will take a considerable amount of time and one that can be accomplished much more quickly.

The first, and most protracted, way to get D.C. residents a voting member of the House of Representatives is by Constitutional Amendment. Most individuals who interpret the Constitution strictly view this route as the only way around the provisions in Article 1, Section 2 concerning members of the House. And there is precedent. Amendment XXIII to the Constitution, ratified on March 29, 1961 gave the residents of D.C. the right to vote for President, even though they are not inhabitants of a state. But the process for amending the Constitution is a lengthy one, and there is an easier and faster way.

Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution give Congress the power “To exercise exclusive Legislation in all cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten miles square) as may, by cession of particular states, and the acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of Government of the United States….” This “Seat of Government” clause or “District” clause seems to grant Congress sole authority over anything and everything pertaining to the District of Columbia, which is our national seat of government.

Many Constitutional legal experts have interpreted this clause as such and have cited it as the only authority Congress needs to transform Delegate Norton’s seat into Representative Norton’s seat. This brings us back to House Resolution 5388.

There is much support from Democrats and Republicans alike for passage of the District’s Voting Rights Act, and it is unlikely to be opposed by anyone who could stop it. Certainly someone or some group will challenge the Constitutionality of the bill, and that is fine. Our system of government is designed for that. In the end, though, I suspect the Supreme Court will uphold the Act and the residents of the District of Columbia will get their voting member of the House.

In a recent question-and-answer session with Rotary Club members, Incoming Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Joseph Biden said that he wanted to take a tougher stance with Mexico over the problem of illegal immigration and that Americans who employ illegal immigrants should be punished. Senator Biden’s approach touches on two critical aspects of any national policy designed to deal with illegal immigration, but he needs to take it one step further.

First, it is important to recognize that immigration has played a positive role in our country’s history and in our ongoing economic success. This country was built on the backs of immigrants and our economy will continue to employ them as long as they continue to come here. But there is a process for entering and working in this country. Unfortunately current policies are not working and immigrants continue to enter the United States illegally, with the vast majority doing so through our border with Mexico.

So Senator Biden is right when he says we have to be tough with the Mexican government. Any truly effective policy for dealing with illegal immigration will have to have international cooperation. The Mexican government is not really interested in stopping its citizens from entering the United States because the Mexican economy cannot provide adequate employment for them and millions of dollars per year are sent back to Mexico by the workers illegally in the United States. In fact, these remittances are second only to oil revenues when it comes to supporting Mexico’s economy. Diplomatic pressure has to be applied to get Mexico to play by the rules and to work out some sort of agreement for Mexican workers to enter the United States legally. Then they can be documented and they can help pay for the government services they enjoy while in this country.

Senator Biden is also correct when he says that Americans who employ illegal immigrants should be punished. The United States currently has laws that if enforced internally could help reign in the problem of illegal immigration. Workers continue to come here illegally because they know that there are jobs available for them. They know that they will be hired, despite their illegal presence in this country, by American citizens and companies looking for cheap labor. These employers must be held accountable and there should be steep penalties imposed on anyone who hires a worker who entered this country illegally.

Finally, we must secure our borders. Senator Biden has previously supported a border fence to slow the rate of illegal crossings, but the installation of a barrier is only part of the solution. Our border patrol must be resourced properly, in terms of both personnel and equipment, if it is to succeed in securing America’s borders. The current number of border patrol agents, even when augmented by military personnel and surveillance equipment, is inadequate to cover the almost 2,000 miles of border between the United States and Mexico. Until the border patrol’s shortfalls are addressed seriously, we cannot expect to put a significant dent in the number of illegal border crossings.

Illegal immigration has been a hot-button issue of late, particularly in the weeks and months leading to the midterm Congressional elections. Yet even with the increased attention it has received, the illegal immigration problem has not been properly addressed. I expect the issue will continue to be a significant point of debate as the various presidential candidates begin to tour the country on the road to the White House in 2008. Debate is good, but action is better. And any action on illegal immigration will have to address the three points made here if it is to have any chance of success. 

When Democrats take control of the House and Senate in January, they will have the opportunity to push through Congress the many legislative promises that they campaigned on in the run-up to the midterm Congressional elections.

Of course, those legislative promises have to be paid for, and the problem for Democrats is that they also promised there would be no new deficit spending. So how can Representative Pelosi and Senator Reid advance their social agenda for the lower and middle classes without engaging in the deficit spending that has become a trademark of Washington politicians? Two options: raise taxes or cut current federal spending programs.

So far, only a few Democrats have openly called for repealing the President’s tax cuts. Several in the new majority promised no increases in taxes during the election campaign and so far the issue doesn’t seem to be high on the priority list when Democrats first start calling the shots in Congress in a couple of months. So that leaves spending cuts, and there is plenty of fat to be trimmed from the bloated federal budget.

According to the Heritage Foundation, federal spending has reached $22,000 per household, in constant dollars, for the first time since World War II and discretionary spending has jumped forty-nine percent in just three years. Congressional spending is out of control and entitlement spending is a significant contributor.

So if cuts are to be made, a good place to start is with the outrageous pet projects that our Senators and Representatives, Democrat and Republican alike, regularly slip into legislative bills to funnel limited federal dollars back to their home districts, states, friends, and business partners.

Citizens Against Government Waste, a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization that tracks government spending, reports in their 2006 edition of The Congressional Pig Book an amazing 10,000 special projects in eleven different legislative bills. The cost to taxpayers so that our politicians can look great to their constituents is an unbelievable $29 billion! And that’s just in the 2006 edition. And what are taxpayers getting for their money? Well, we gave $13.5 million for the International Fund for Ireland, which includes money for the World Toilet Summit. And we added $500,000 for the Arctic Winter Games and $5.6 million for studying the effects of alcohol and drug abuse to defense spending bills.

Granted, the $29 billion outlined in the 2006 Pig Book are but a tiny drop in an ever-increasing federal budget, but it is a great place to start. While the savings to American taxpayers would be minimal considering the overall level of federal spending, the limiting of “special” projects that waste taxpayer dollars would be an important psychological victory. It would send the message that both Democrats and Republicans understand that they have a responsibility to spend taxpayer funds wisely, for those funds are limited and must be used for worthwhile projects and programs.

The 2007 federal budget sent to Congress by President Bush will cost taxpayers $2.77 trillion. It is imperative that we find savings by trimming unnecessary fat and reigning in reckless pet projects. In the absence of reform, the Heritage foundation says in its Issues 2006 Candidate’s Briefing Book, the Congress will be faced with limited options.

First, raise taxes every year until they are 57% higher than today, something no Democrat or Republican wants to be responsible for. Second, eliminate every federal program except Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid by 2045, which is never going to happen. And third, do nothing, which would threaten the entire economic well-being of the country.

It is not hard to see that reform and fiscal restraint are our best options. Right now the Congress is doing nothing, and Americans continue to pay the price for their irresponsibility. Nancy Pelosi has proposed a “pay-as-you-go” policy that would force lawmakers to find a way to pay for new programs before they are adopted. It is a step in the right direction, provided that direction does not mean raising taxes. Remember, low tax rates are not the problem, careless federal spending is. Ms. Pelosi and the Democrats have an opportunity before them as they take control of the Congress. The question now is whether or not they will seize that opportunity for the sake of our country.