The Washington Times reported September 15 that Senator John McCain, the Republican presidential nominee, has a stronger record of bipartisanship than does Senator Barack Obama, the Democratic presidential nominee. Writing for the Times, Stephen Dinan says, “Whether looking at bills they have led on or bills they have signed onto, Mr. McCain has reached across the aisle far more frequently and with more members than Mr. Obama since the latter came to the Senate in 2005.”

According to the report, Democrats accounted for 55 percent of McCain’s political alliances during the last two Congresses, while Obama only had Republican co-sponsors 13 percent of the time. Senator McCain has been the primary sponsor of more than 80 pieces of legislation during the last two Congresses, Dinan writes, with 120 Democratic co-sponsors out of 220 total co-sponsors, which equates to 55 percent.

Senator Obama, on the other hand, was the primary sponsor of 120 pieces of legislation with just 75 Republican co-sponsors out of 597 total co-sponsors, or 13 percent, according to Dinan. The Times analysis, which looked at both legislation that each presidential candidate sponsored and signed onto from another sponsor, supports McCain’s claim that he regularly works across party lines in the Senate.

Issues on which Mr. McCain has reached across the aisle to Democrats include climate change, government spending, torture, campaign finance reform, immigration, gun control, a patients’ bill of rights, and tax cuts, the report says.

According to the Times, an Obama spokesman declined to comment on the analysis of the two candidates’ legislative records. In addition, the Times noted, Obama aide Robert Gibbs said during the Republican convention that Senators Lugar and Coburn could attest to Senator Obama’s bipartisanship. But when questioned, Senator Lugar’s spokesman declined to be interviewed and Senator Coburn said that while Senator Obama was good to work with, there was “no comparison” to the record of Senator McCain.

And while McCain has often cited work with Democratic Senators Ted Kennedy of Massachusetts, Russell Feingold of Wisconsin, and Byron Dorgan of North Dakota, all three declined to comment on the analysis or failed to respond to requests from the Times, Dinan writes.

In closing, the Times analysis cites Congressional Quarterly studies as showing that Senator McCain has voted with Senate Republicans 85 percent of the time during his Senate career, while Senator Obama has voted with Senate Democrats 97 percent of the time since he was elected in November 2004.

The BBC ran an article September 9 saying, in reference to Democratic presidential candidate Senator Barack Obama, “…people across the world want him in the White House….” The article presented the results of a BBC poll that found in 17 of 22 countries surveyed, “…people expect relations between the US and the rest of the world to improve if Senator Obama wins.”

In all of the 22 countries polled, the BBC said, the people would rather Obama win the presidency over Republican rival John McCain. The poll questioned more than 23,000 people from across the globe and was conducted by Globescan.

Specifically, Obama enjoyed spreads of anywhere from 9 percent in India to 82 percent in Kenya, his father’s home country, with an average of almost half, 49 percent, preferring Obama. According to the BBC, forty percent of respondents did not take a position.

There is one question that must be asked: Why? Why would other nations really want an Obama presidency more than a McCain presidency? Is it because they truly believe their relations with the United States will improve? Or could it be because they are looking out for their own self interests and not America’s interests or even global interests, expecting that an Obama presidency would be much more likely to produce an America willing to defer to international will?

Are the interests of these other nations necessarily the same as our interests? In some cases, they most certainly are. In others, they are not. One only has to look to the United Nations to realize that countries act to further their own national goals and not the goals of other nations or even the goals of the international community, if such a thing truly exists. So when citizens of other countries offer their opinion about whom we should choose as our president, who are they looking out for?

Dr. Loren Thompson of the Lexington Institute wrote in an issue brief today that not only are Senators Barack Obama and John McCain surprisingly close in their policies for U.S. national security, but that both presidential candidates “…see future security challenges pretty much the same way Donald Rumsfeld did.”

In “Rumsfeld Was Right: Candidates Embrace Bush Worldview,” Thompson begins by recounting a speech given at the Citadel by then-candidate George W. Bush. In the speech, Thompson recalls, Bush laid out three goals he would pursue if he was elected to the presidency: to renew the bond of trust between the American president and the American military, to defend the American people against missiles and terror, and to begin creating the military of the next century.

It is Bush’s last goal that Thompson focuses on in making his case. The principles promoted by Bush’s first Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, for transforming the military to meet the threats of the next century were as follows (listed in this order by Thompson): Defeat asymmetric threats; optimize intelligence; bolster homeland security; build global partnerships; improve counter-insurgency skills; integrate military and non-military instruments; become better at stability operations; and, reform Pentagon processes.

According to Thompson’s analysis, which draws on statements from the candidates, “The key security initiatives favored by both Senator McCain and Senator Obama echo the assumptions of the Bush-Cheney-Rumsfeld worldview.”

With respect to McCain, Thompson says the Republican presidential candidate “…differs with Pentagon policy under Rumsfeld in wanting to increase the size of the military. But most of his security priorities are in tune with the Bush approach to transformation, stressing improved homeland security against terrorists and missile attack, better intelligence, more funding for unconventional warfare skills and ‘working with friend and partners overseas.’”

With respect to Senator Obama, Thompson says the Democratic presidential candidate “…seems to agree with all of these views. He says ‘we must meet the full-spectrum needs of the new century, not simply recreate the military of the Cold War era.’” Thompson goes on to write that Obama also calls “…for funding of special operations forces, information operations and, surprisingly, missile defense.” Obama also “…endorses Bush’s call for a bigger military” and advocated structuring our military capabilities for both conventional war and non-standard military operations.  Thompson then states that Obama’s “…positions on cyber warfare, rebuilding global partnerships and reforming the acquisition process all sound similar to those of McCain.”

He concludes his analysis by saying, “More strikingly, both candidates sound like they think Bush and Rumsfeld were right about what the future requires, even if Iraq was a mistake.”

One can’t help but wonder how the candidates would respond if they were told they shared some views with Donald Rumsfeld.

In a new article for the Center for Defense Information, Mark Burgess wrote that the current NATO fight in Afghanistan, the defense alliance’s first war, could be its last.

While Mr. Burgess rightly notes that the arguments against NATO’s relevance may be exaggerated, he cites several factors that are actively undermining the alliance’s reason for existing. Originally designed as a counter to the Soviet threat during the Cold War, NATO has attempted to redefine itself by leading the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, an effort that is stressing the alliance almost to the breaking point.

Problems listed by Mr. Burgess include:

* The conduct of counterinsurgency operations. NATO was designed as a conventional force, with conventional doctrine, to combat the Soviet Union in the event that the Cold War turned hot. NATO member countries participating in the fighting in Afghanistan have had great difficulty adapting to the counterinsurgency threat posed by the Taliban and remnants of al-Qaeda.

* Lack of a common strategy. Several of the NATO countries in Afghanistan are following their own command structures and their own strategies. Much of the effort is uncoordinated with other participant nations or with the Afghan government. The lack of unity of effort hinders overall progress against insurgent elements.

* National caveats. National caveats are restrictions on troops that are put in place by their national government. They can include where certain troops are allowed to go, what missions they are allowed to undertake, and what their particular rules of engagement are. For example, German soldiers are not allowed to conduct combat operations, limited instead to reconstruction work as dictated by the German government. The result is that a handful of NATO countries are doing the actual fighting, leading to tensions and resentment within the alliance.

* Post-war chaos. Mr. Burgess says that the United States, while successful in quickly deposing the Taliban government in Afghanistan, neglected the stability and security phase immediately following the end of the initial fighting. That resulted in NATO inheriting a chaotic situation in which the Taliban was able to reorganize and threaten the Karzai government.

* Pakistan. Pakistan has done the bare minimum to satisfy U.S. requirements in the global war on terrorism. The result has been a safe haven for the Taliban and remnants of al-Qaeda in the Afghan-Pakistan border area where militants freely cross from Pakistan into Afghanistan to attack NATO and Afghani forces. NATO has not yet found an adequate solution for addressing the threat emanating from Pakistan.

The author notes several other factors that could contribute to NATO’s demise, including the recent conflict between Georgia and Russia and NATO consideration of Georgia and Ukraine for Membership Action Plans that could lead to full membership in the defense alliance. While current tensions with Russia over ballistic missile defense, the Georgia conflict, and NATO expansion into traditional Russian spheres of influence could profoundly impact NATO, it’s performance in actual combat in Afghanistan could be the driving factor in whether or not NATO remains relevant in the post-Cold War world.

A poll conducted by the Levada Center immediately following the Russo-Georgian war last month found that 75 percent of those surveyed said Russian-American relations were “not good,” and another 39 percent said the relations were “chilly.” A smaller percentage, 28 percent said relations were “strained,” and 8 percent said they were “hostile.”

The poll revealed that a full 47 percent believe that major Western countries are Russia’s enemies and will cause harm to Russian interests if they can. When asked about the war with Georgia, just about half said the U.S. was trying to “spread its influence over Russia’s neighbors,” and nearly three-quarters said the West’s support of Georgia is an attempt “to weaken Russia and force it out of the Caucasus.”

The Russian people were demoralized after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and most have welcomed the push for a new nationalist spirit and renewed Russian pride championed by Vladimir Putin over the past half decade. High energy prices have increased the quality of life for the average Russian, and Putin’s push for a stronger Russia on the international stage has been enthusiastically embraced at home.

But Putin has done more than just push for a stronger, more nationalist Russia. He has worked feverishly to reverse the few democratic gains that were made in the 1990s, has used energy as a diplomatic weapon, has invested heavily in the Russian military, and has worked to counter the United States on virtually every significant international issue.

The war with Georgia was just Putin’s latest jab at the west. Medvedev may be president, but few actually believe that he is calling the shots when it comes to Russian foreign policy. The real problem for the West is that the Russians are buying what Putin is selling. And with the Russian people on his side, Putin is likely to continue his adversarial relationship with the West, knowing that Europe has no stomach for a fight with Russia and that the United States is too occupied in Afghanistan and Iraq to do much to stop him.

By Greg C. Reeson  

The New York Times ran an article September 3^rd citing campaign aides as saying the McCain campaign would focus on U.S. successes in Iraq, particularly in the once troubled Anbar Province, as it heads into the final stretch of the election season following this week’s Republican National Convention.

Focusing on Iraq is a smart approach for Senator McCain because it allows him to highlight his greatest strength while further exposing Senator Obama’s chief weakness: the courage and judgment to be commander-in-chief of a country at war.

Well before President Bush decided to send additional U.S. military forces to Baghdad and Anbar Province, Senator McCain was lobbying for an increase in the number of American troops in Iraq, and for a change in strategy to confront the reality that we were in danger of losing the war.

Senator McCain showed courage and sound judgment in calling for more combat power at a time when violence in Iraq was spinning out of control, when many in the American public and in Washington were calling for a U.S. withdrawal, and when much of the world expected the United States to retreat from Iraq in humiliating defeat.

McCain’s courage is the result of a lifetime of heroic service to his nation. As a prisoner of war in Vietnam, he rejected an offer from his captors to be freed early, instead choosing to remain with his fellow servicemen in a hellish prison where torture was routine. As a candidate, he once proclaimed he would rather lose the presidential election than have the United States lose the Iraq war.  

Senator McCain’s judgment is the kind that comes about only after a lifetime of learning and experience. McCain was able to see what was happening in Iraq because he had made multiple trips to the country over the course of several years that enabled him to assess the conditions on the ground firsthand. He was able to see for himself that what the United States was doing was not working, and that a bold course of action would be required to secure Iraq and set the conditions that would eventually allow America’s soldiers to return home. Politically unpopular at the time, it was the right call for the United States, and it was based on knowledge and experience that take decades to acquire.

Senator Obama says that he had the judgment to oppose the Iraq war from the beginning. But he argued against the war while a state senator in Illinois, without access to the same information as those in the United States Senate, like Joe Biden and Hillary Clinton, who voted to authorize the use of force against Saddam Hussein. He may have made his argument based on a core belief that the war was wrong, or he may have made his argument based on the wishes of the Chicago constituency he represented. What is certain is that he did not make his argument as an elected member of the United States Senate, where the stakes were considerably higher than the stakes in the Illinois legislature.

Senator Obama also argued against the surge of American forces to Iraq, saying not only that such a move would not work, but that more troops would likely make the situation worse. He made that assessment based on one visit to Iraq in January of 2006. It was only after the success of the surge became undeniable to everyone but Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid and Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi that Senator Obama begrudgingly acknowledged that the additional American forces had in fact improved security in Iraq.

Now, just over a year and a half after President Bush ordered additional American forces to Iraq to stop the bloodletting, the United States has handed over security responsibility for Anbar Province to the Iraqi government. Anbar, once the most violent region in all of Iraq and witness to some of the most atrocious acts of the war perpetrated by al Qaeda fighters, is now one of the country’s calmest regions, just two years after an American intelligence officer said the province was lost and could not be saved. This reversal could not have happened without an American commitment, in blood and treasure, to the Iraqi Sunnis who decided that enough was enough, and that it was time to retake control of their country.

The years ahead will be difficult ones for the United States. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq will continue for the foreseeable future, Pakistan is increasingly unstable and unpredictable, and a resurgent Russia is flexing its muscles in its near abroad in an attempt to regain some of the influence that was lost with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Islamic extremists are active in Somalia, Yemen, the Philippines, Indonesia, and the Maghreb, and China is using its economic might to reduce its military deficit with the United States.

The future promises to be one of turmoil and conflict, and while it is impossible to predict what foreign policy challenges will most test the next president, one thing is certain: the United States will need a strong, experienced commander-in-chief capable of exercising sound judgment based on the best information available to him.

By Greg C. Reeson

An increasing number of reports coming out of Iraq indicate that the United States and the Maliki government are close to completing an agreement for the continued presence of U.S. forces. Reuters even reported August 25 that Prime Minister Maliki, in a speech to tribal sheiks in the Green Zone, has said a final agreement has been reached.

Whether an agreement has been finalized or not, the outlines of the proposed pact, together with the caveat statements made by Iraqi officials, that have emerged thus far appear to be an acceptance of President Bush’s demand for a conditions-based withdrawal of U.S. forces.

According to leaked details, the draft security agreement calls for U.S. combat troops to leave Iraqi cities and villages by June 30 of next year. It further calls for a departure of all U.S. forces from Iraq by the end of 2011. Sticking points that are in the fine tuning stages of negotiation include legal immunity for U.S. troops in Iraq and a few other lesser details. But putting talk of specific dates aside, the realities on the ground in Iraq will dictate that the final agreement be conditions-based, and not beholden to a rigid timetable. Here’s why.

First, to state the blatantly obvious, a conditions-based approach provides military commanders the flexibility to respond to long-term trends in the patterns of violence. Knowing they have the ability to reinforce, or reduce, troop levels as needed, military commanders can plan long-term strategies designed to ensure the security necessary for political progress. In short, it just makes good military sense.

Second, while Iraqi security forces continue to grow in both size and capability, they have a long way to go. Sectarian rivalries still exist within the ranks, and both equipment and competency shortfalls still need to be addressed. Even more importantly, Iraqi security forces lack strong officers and noncommissioned officers. Leaders take time to develop, and in the case of Iraq, where leadership positions under Saddam Hussein were awarded based on personal acquaintance and loyalty to Saddam, the United States literally started from scratch. And the Iraqi police, considered vital to the type of local, among-the-people interaction needed to combat an insurgency, are in even more need of assistance than the Iraqi Army. The training effort is ongoing, and progress is being made. To abandon the army and police forces before they are ready to provide security for the country is to doom Iraq to failed state status.

Third, elections scheduled for later this year, or more likely for early next year, will put recent political accommodations to the test. U.S. and Iraqi forces have prepared for elections in the past by increasing the number of available troops to help head off increased levels of violence that often accompany struggles for power in developing states. Both U.S. and Iraqi leaders need to have the means at their disposal, in other words the ability to deploy security forces, to meet the challenges that will surely arise as a result of the elections. A fixed withdrawal timeline makes this impossible.

Fourth, al Qaeda in Iraq is down, but not out. Changes at the tactical level that accompanied the surge of U.S. forces last year increased pressure on al Qaeda elements in Iraq and rooted them out of the vast majority of their strongholds. Many have been killed, and others have fled to Afghanistan to join the fight against the NATO coalition. But some hardcore elements remain in Iraq and their ability to conduct large-scale bombings that produce mass casualties still pose a grave threat to the Iraqi government. As the threat level continues to decline, military commanders can make assessments and recommendations on troop levels to the President. But a premature easing of the pressure being applied to al Qaeda in Iraq could give the group new life.

Finally, Muqtada al-Sadr’s intentions remain unclear. Sadr recently reorganized his Mahdi Army into a cultural wing to foster ties with the Iraqi people and an armed wing to continue the fight against U.S.-led forces. Sadr has been losing ground in Iraq in the wake of continuing offensives by U.S. and Iraqi forces, and he appears to be attempting to figure out a way to stay relevant. He is very popular among Iraq’s Shi’a, largely due to a social services network modeled after Hezbollah’s in Lebanon. But his continued absence from Iraq, ostensibly for religious studies in Iran, weakens his position and threatens his movement. The continued presence of U.S. forces, based on regular assessments of the security situation, allows the government of Iraq to continue to increase its capacity to deal with threats like al Sadr. As that capacity grows, the need for U.S. forces will diminish.

None of this is new, even for the most casual of Iraq observers. But the fact remains that there are valid reasons for determining U.S. troop levels based on conditions, and not on time. Iraqi leaders know this, and their caveats when talking about timetables demonstrate their understanding of the realities on the ground.

On August 22, The New York Times quoted Mohammad Hamoud, Iraq’s chief negotiator, as saying the draft security pact contained provisions that allowed the “timetable” to be adjusted based on the security situation. The Times also quoted another senior Iraqi official as saying the dates in the pact were “prospective,” and dependent on the ability of Iraqi forces to provide security.

In another article last week, The Los Angeles Times quoted Ali Dabbagh, an Iraqi government spokesman, as saying the dates in the proposed security agreement were “hypothetical,” and that ultimately Iraqi national security interests would dictate the pace of any U.S. withdrawal.

What’s happening right now is that Iraqi leaders are tailoring their public statements in response to domestic political pressures while privately expressing a realistic understanding of the challenges they still face. Even Prime Minister Maliki, who has of late been stepping up his timetable rhetoric, has generally included caveats in his statements that include phrases like “conditions permitting,” and “if conditions hold.”

There’s nothing wrong with articulating goals, or “time horizons,” or “aspirations.” The Iraqi people don’t want to be dependent on U.S. troops, and the United States needs to relieve some of the stress on its ground forces and free up assets for other global crises that will undoubtedly arise.

But officials in both Iraq and the United States recognize what is at stake. And that’s why a conditions-based approach to U.S. troop withdrawals will ultimately prevail, even if it contains adjustable dates.

By Greg C. Reeson

Late in the day on August 7, Georgian military forces entered the breakaway republic of South Ossetia in Georgia’s north central region in an effort to reclaim control of the hotly contested province. Less than 48 hours later, Russian troops entered the fray, ostensibly to protect Russian peacekeepers and Russian citizens in South Ossetia, advancing to a point less than 50 miles from the Georgian capital of Tbilisi. In the wake of a French-brokered cease-fire, Russia’s true motives have become increasingly clear.

Russian motivations for intervening in Georgia on behalf of South Ossetia can be summarized as follows. First, Russia was anxious to counter U.S. influence in the Caucasus, having watched for years as Georgia and the United States increased diplomatic, economic, and military cooperation, and as the Georgian government pushed for membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Georgia under Mikhail Saakashvili, prodded and supported by the United States, has been taunting Russia for a very long time. Moscow finally decided it was time to act, using South Ossetia as a means for pushing back against U.S.-led western encroachment.

Second, Russia wanted to send a clear message not only to the nations of the Caucasus region, but to all states that once comprised the former Soviet Union. Make no mistake about it, the audience targeted by Moscow included Ukraine, which has, like Georgia, been distancing itself from Russia while fostering closer ties with the United States, and Poland and the Czech Republic, former Soviet satellite states now serving as hosts for U.S. ballistic missile defense systems. The message: cooperation with the west can be dangerous, and may not be tolerated.

Finally, Russia wanted to show the world that it was well on its way to a full recovery from the dismal times that had followed the collapse of the Soviet Union. While Moscow understood that it had not regained its former superpower status, it was intent on demonstrating that it was capable of asserting itself as a regional power, with the means and the will to impose its wishes on neighboring countries if it felt the need to do so.

Some have speculated that Russia’s support of South Ossetia was in part payback for western support of Kosovo’s independence from Serbia. I find that argument a little hard to swallow. It is true that Russia had expressed its opposition to Kosovo’s independence, and had warned of the potential consequences of western support for the redrawing of borders in the Balkans. But to suggest that Russia was willing to use armed intervention to support the independence of a breakaway province on its periphery is a bit of a stretch. Rather, it is more probable that larger, more complex issues, like those cited above, were instrumental in Russia’s decision to go to war with Georgia.

So, what did Russia accomplish with its intervention in South Ossetia and its invasion of Georgia proper? Strategic Forecasting (STRATFOR), a private geopolitical intelligence firm based in Austin, recently argued that Russia had demonstrated three things with its Georgian expedition. The first was that the Russian military was capable of mounting a successful operation. This was important for Russia, for many in the west had discounted the ability of the Russian military to undertake meaningful offensive action given the degradation in equipment and resources that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union. The success of Russian forces in South Ossetia and Georgia, Russia’s first offensive action since the fall of the Soviet empire, made it clear that Russia has regained some of its former military capability and is once again capable of operating militarily in its border regions.

Second, STRATFOR says, the Russians demonstrated that they could defeat a U.S.-trained military force. I would argue that the jury is jury is still out on this one, and the verdict is far from being assured. The United States has been providing military assistance and training to Georgia for years, but that assistance and training has been focused on two tasks: counterterrorism activities and Iraq. Neither of those tasks is suited for the type of war launched by the Russians. Given the immediacy of the terrorist threat in nearby Chechnya and the ongoing conflict in Iraq, U.S. trainers were not preparing Georgian soldiers to conduct traditional force-on-force combat operations against Russian invaders.

Third on STRATFOR’s list was that Russia had demonstrated the United States and NATO were in no position to intervene militarily. This comes as a surprise to no one. With U.S. troops committed to two active theaters of combat, Afghanistan and Iraq, there simply are no additional forces available for contingencies that may arise elsewhere in the world. NATO, which has been reluctant to fulfill its promised troop contributions in Afghanistan, could hardly be expected to intervene against the Russians on behalf of a non-NATO member.

About all the United States and Europe can do for Georgia right now is to provide humanitarian assistance and diplomatic rhetoric at the United Nations. Even that is more symbolic than substantive. The Russians control the main east-west road in Georgia and the seaport of Poti, limiting the freedom of maneuver of those providing outside assistance. At the United Nations, Russia holds veto power in the Security Council, making it impossible to even get a U.N. resolution critical of Russia’s actions. The real lesson here is that U.S. and European allies are now feeling vulnerable, unsure whether they could rely on outside assistance in the face of aggression from a resurgent Russia.

Russia still has a long way to go in its attempt to reclaim its former superpower status. But its intervention in Georgia has demonstrated that Russia is once again a power to be reckoned with, and that its wishes, often dismissed out of hand in the years following the end of the Cold War, can no longer be ignored. Russia’s invasion of Georgia was designed to put the west, and the United States in particular, on notice: Russia is back.

The critical factor driving more aggressive operations, rightly noted by Schippert, is the changing situation not in Washington, but in Pakistan.

While Pakistan has never been a consistently reliable partner in the war on terror, the United States has, in general, been able to count on Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf to provide at least some level of support to U.S. forces in the form of overflight rights, ground transit of critical war materiel, deployment of Pakistani forces to the border area, etc. However, recent governmental changes within Pakistan make continued cooperation a tenuous prospect, at best.

Opposition victories in parliamentary elections diminished Musharraf's power, and it is highly likely that he is nearing the end of his reign as Pakistan's president. Factions within the parliament are spearheading efforts to "talk" to Islamic militants and to scale back offensive actions in the border region that are designed to put pressure on Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters.

It is becoming increasingly clear that if the United States wants to maintain the offensive on militants in the border region, and inside Pakistan, it is going to have to do it without the help of the Pakistani government. That's why we've seen an increase in cross border attacks by U.S. drones and artillery units, and that's why we've seen a more assertive Afghan government threatening to take action if Pakistan fails to control attacks from its territory (knowing full well that the Afghan government is incapable of undertaking offensive operations in the border region, let alone, inside Pakistani territory, and that any action taken would be with heavy assistance from U.S. forces).

What Bush critics have gotten wrong all along is what motivates the President. Of course he's made mistakes. Show me one president who hasn't. But he consistently takes actions he believes to be in the best interest of the country. No matter what you may think of his beliefs, he sticks to them. Ordering stepped up efforts to capture or kill bin Laden reflects his understanding of the changing geopolitical realities in the region. The day will soon be here when we can no longer count on Pakistani assistance in the fight against the Taliban and al-Qaeda. It is better to ramp up our military measures now, rather than later when it will likely be much more difficult, and much more costly.

I, for one, firmly believe (and here is where I catch flak from the Bush-haters) that President Bush cares more about winning in Afghanistan and Iraq than he does about his legacy. If the United States emerges victorious from these two critical battlefields, Islamic terrorism will have been dealt a serious blow and history will be kind to President Bush. If, however, we fail in the current fight, our enemies will be emboldened to strike at us again and the legacy of George W. Bush will not matter at all.

By Greg C. Reeson

This past weekend on Fox News Sunday, Brit Hume remarked that the upcoming presidential election had little to do with John McCain and was instead a referendum on the Democratic nominee, Senator Barack Obama. Is the country ready for an African American president? Are Americans searching for something new, having grown tired of the business-as-usual mentality in Washington? Has President Bush so destroyed the Republican Party that no GOP candidate has a legitimate shot at winning this November?

These are all fair questions, but at this point in the contest the answers are purely speculative. What is not speculative is Obama’s plan for America if he is elected to the White House this November. The “Blueprint for Change,” published just prior to the Iowa Caucus, offers a glimpse into where this country is headed if the Senator from Illinois becomes the next President of the United States.

Domestically, Obama’s plan has three primary themes: a massive increase in the size and scope of government; the further redistribution of wealth within American society; and more government control coupled with a corresponding decrease in individual accountability and responsibility. Here are a few examples.

First, let’s look at Obama’s plan for growing the government. Despite his pledge at the beginning of the blueprint “…to put government back in your hands, where it belongs,” an Obama presidency promises substantial and sustained increases in the size and scope of the federal government that will result in more control over the lives of ordinary Americans and more interference with the conduct of private business. Take, for instance, Senator Obama’s support for free television and radio time for political campaigns. For starters, there is no such thing as “free” air time. Private broadcast stations would be forced to accept programming directed by the government (incurring cost in freedom of choice), consumers would be forced to watch or listen to programming directed by the government (incurring cost in freedom of choice), and one can only speculate that the “free” time would be paid for with taxpayer dollars (presumably at a rate not conducive to profit-making for the broadcast stations).

Keeping with the grow-the-government and take control of people’s lives theme, Obama supports the creation of a National Health Insurance Exchange that would “help” individuals purchase private insurance plans. I’m not sure how inserting government into individual choice and private business “helps” anyone, given that government does few things more efficiently than individuals and private sector companies. Under Obama’s plan, insurers would be forced to issue every applicant an insurance policy, with monthly premiums set without regard to the health of the individual. Employers who fail to contribute to their employees’ health care costs will be required to pay money into the national plan. Does anyone believe that these costs will not be passed on to consumers? Again, private companies will be told by the federal government who they will do business with and how that business will be conducted.

On nearly every page of Obama’s blueprint you will find the words “create,” “expand,” “provide capital,” “increase,” “double,” and even “quadruple.” It’s not hard to see that the Blueprint for Change is a recipe for a massive growth of the federal government that will provide national direction in lieu of individual choice.

Senator Obama is also a clear advocate of the further redistribution of wealth within American society. His plan calls for the creation of a new “Making Work Pay” tax credit of up to $500 per person, or $1,000 per working family. According to Obama, the tax credit would wipe out any tax burden at all for 10 million families. Additionally, Obama advocates reversing most of the tax cuts of 2001 and 2003. Given the massive increases in government spending planned in the blueprint, it’s pretty easy to see that Obama will shift the tax burden to those Americans who are able to pay more. The “wealthiest” Americans can expect higher income taxes and higher Social Security taxes, while more of their fellow citizens are taken off the tax rolls altogether. And while the “wealthiest” are not clearly defined in the blueprint, I, as a government employee who makes more than $97,500 (the current salary cap for Social Security taxes) and who benefited from the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts, can expect to see less of my paycheck each month under an Obama administration (never mind that I have four kids and, living in the Washington, D.C. area, am decidedly middle class).

A third defining feature of Senator Obama’s plan is a decrease in individual responsibility, which fits in nicely with the increased control of the federal government over the lives of American citizens. Under the Obama plan, health insurance options for young adults would expand to the point where 25-year old men and women would be allowed to stay on their parents’ health plans. I say men and women because at the age of 25 you should no longer be a child dependent on mommy and daddy. You should be capable of independent thought and able to exercise individual choice, while accepting the responsibility and accountability that go along with free will.

A President Obama would also establish a fund to help Americans refinance their mortgages while providing “…comprehensive support to innocent homeowners.” Call me naïve, but I believe that adults who enter into mortgages are really not all that innocent, and should be held accountable for either not understanding what they were getting themselves into or for accepting risk with adjustable rate mortgages that could increase interest rates beyond their ability to pay. And guess who would be providing the funds to bail these homeowners out? You guessed it: other taxpayers.

Finally, Senator Obama wants to implement a retirement security plan that will force employers to automatically enroll employees in a direct deposit IRA. Of course, an employee can always opt out, but government is still interjecting itself into the workplace and forcing individuals to save for retirement unless they take additional steps to stop the payroll deduction. This retirement security plan implies that Americans are not capable of making retirement savings decisions on their own. Instead, the federal government comes in, absolves them of any personal responsibility (unless, of course, they choose to opt out of the plan), and makes the decisions about what’s best for individual workers.

In the foreign policy realm, Obama’s blueprint clings to an Iraq plan that does not acknowledge the positive trends experienced since President Bush’s surge of additional troops into Anbar Province and Baghdad last year. Senator Obama maintains his call for a steady withdrawal of troops, without regard for the risks to the security gains made since last September, arguing that the best way to pressure Iraqi leaders is to make it clear we are leaving. Of course, this plan in no way takes into consideration the ability of Iraqi security forces. The belief is that if we start to leave, the Iraqi Army and police will suddenly be spurred into action, accepting responsibility for the security of their nation. Whether or not they are actually able to provide their own security is of little importance. I can envision now the sight of the last American troops leaving Baghdad in helicopters from the roof of the American Embassy because Iraqi Security Forces were just not quite ready.

The other major feature of Senator Obama’s foreign policy plan is his willingness to meet with Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. The Obama blueprint offers nothing new for Iran except the promise of a face-to-face with the American President. Obama’s offer of World Trade Organization membership in exchange for Iranian abandonment of its nuclear program and support for terrorism has already been rejected by Tehran, as has his offer of economic investments. Is the hatred of George W. Bush so strong that we are to believe Khamenei and Ahmadinejad will give up their nuclear pursuits just because a new guy is in the White House? They must be laughing hysterically in Iran.

Mr. Hume was onto something when he said this past weekend that the November presidential election would be a referendum on Barack Obama. It should be about him. But when voters go to the polls to cast their ballots, they should do so not based on whether they think the country is ready for an African American president or out of some lingering hatred for President Bush. They should do so based on whether or not they believe Senator Obama’s Blueprint for Change is the right path for America to take in the years ahead.