After receiving a considerable amount of grief from John McCain and the Republican National Committee, Barack Obama has decided to consider visiting Iraq this summer. The last time Obama traveled to the war zone to meet with our troops was about two years ago. This is an important point, to be sure. It is hard to fathom that a leading contender for the presidency has not made even semi-regular visits to observe first-hand what is generally considered to be the United States’ top foreign policy challenge. But what is most troubling is that Obama appears to be nonchalant about the matter, acting as though knowledge of the realities on the ground in Iraq is just not that important.

I imagine Obama will meet with a tough crowd if he does indeed decide to visit our soldiers and commanders in Iraq. After all, it is doubtful that many will agree with the idea of leaving a job half-finished or making military decisions based on arbitrary dates or troop withdrawal rates (one to two brigades per month according to the Obama plan) without regard for the tactical situation or the potential consequences involved. Of course, it is possible that Obama will have a change of heart if he goes to Iraq with open eyes and an open mind. The last time he was there, sectarian violence was spinning out of control and al Qaeda fighters were unleashing horrific attacks that that threatened to plunge the country into all-out civil war. Since then, however, the situation has become strikingly different. According to the Institute for the Study of War, as of May 2008 the following had occurred:

*Overall attacks dropped more than 50% between December 2006 and December 2007.

*IED explosions dropped from more than 1,500 per month in December 2006 to about 700 per month in December 2007.

*High profile attacks (car bombs, suicide vests, etc.) dropped form about 80 in December 2006 to about 50 in November 2007.

*Indirect fire attacks (rockets, mortars, etc.) dropped from just over 800 in December 2006 to less than 400 in October 2007.

*Attacks in Anbar Province, once considered lost by a Marine intelligence officer, dropped from around 1100 in December 2006 to just over 200 in August 2007.

*Civilian deaths dropped from more than 3,500 in December 2006 to around 700 in February 2008.

*Ethno-sectarian deaths dropped from about 1,600 in December 2006 to about 100 in February 2008.

All of this is good news, of course, but perhaps the most striking statistic is this one: the number of weapons caches found by coalition and Iraqi forces increased from about 80 in December 2006 to more than 200 in February 2008. What’s important about this statistic is that it reflects a population that feels safe and secure enough to provide coalition and Iraqi forces with the intelligence required to find hidden weapons and get them of the streets. Locals don’t come forward with information when they are terrified of being killed by insurgents. They come forward when they have confidence in the ability of security forces to protect them.

What I have learned over the years is that there is no substitute for first-hand knowledge. As a battalion operations officer in Iraq several years ago, I was responsible for the force protection plan for our forward operating base in a nasty little spot between Fallujah and Ramadi. I took my responsibility seriously, and walked the ground around our perimeter, carefully looking at the terrain’s features before deciding on the best locations for our guard towers and fighting positions. When another unit came to take over our FOB, my counterpart laid a map on the table in front of me and pointed out where he intended make changes to the force protection plan. I was confused about his plans and questioned his reasoning. His ideas, it turned out, were based on his assessment of the terrain as indicated on a map of the area. He did not take the time to personally examine the perimeter or the terrain, and his plan reflected his lack of first-hand knowledge.

So, will Obama go to Iraq and then acknowledge, based on first-hand experience that the security situation has indeed gotten better, and that hasty calls for withdrawal without regard to consequences or gains made may be premature? I doubt it. Senator Obama’s own statements are indicative of a man who seemingly does not place much value on first-hand experience and knowledge. While traveling on Wednesday, Obama told reporters, according to the Associated Press, that his lack of visits to Iraq were “not relevant.”

By Greg C. Reeson

Over the past few months, several factors have contributed to what appears to be a renewed focus by the Bush administration on the war in Afghanistan. Of course, the ongoing violence in Iraq is still center stage at the White House, in the Congress, on the campaign trail, and in the minds of American citizens. But there can be little doubt that President Bush is taking steps, with a new sense of urgency, to shift resources and attention to the faltering war against remnants of the Taliban and al-Qaeda.

Shifting U.S. attention to Afghanistan at this particular moment makes sense. Trend lines in Iraq indicate a clear reduction in most indicators of violence over the past eight months, while violence levels in Afghanistan are steadily increasing as confident Taliban fighters seek to exert more control and influence outside of traditional strongholds. As troop levels in Iraq continue to decline, more combat power is needed in Afghanistan where NATO member countries have consistently fallen short in providing the necessary resources in personnel, equipment, and, more importantly, combat capability. Finally, an increasingly unstable Pakistan is proving more and more unwilling, or unable, to control Islamist militants within Pakistan and along the border with Afghanistan. Each of these deserves further attention.

A resurgent Taliban has been consistently increasing the number of attacks against coalition forces, the Karzai government, and Afghan civilians. Each year since the U.S.-led invasion in late 2001 has become more deadly than the last, and each year the Taliban has pushed a little farther out of its safe havens, taking control of more and more territory and terrorizing a frightened population that has no confidence in the ability of coalition or government troops to protect it. Al-Qaeda remnants still exist, but they are largely confined to the tribal areas along the border with Pakistan and exercise little, if any, command and control capability. Still, they threaten the future stability of Afghanistan and have to be reckoned with.

NATO has failed to meet U.S. expectations since taking the lead in Afghanistan in 2003. Not only are troop contributions from member countries insufficient for the task at hand, but national caveats and short-term deployments hinder operational effectiveness and the flexibility of commanders to employ troops when and where they are most needed. While most of the combat burden is being borne by the United States, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Canada, other member countries prohibit their forces from serving in dangerous areas or engaging in any form of combat except in cases of self-defense. Additionally, member country tour lengths typically fall far short of the deployment cycles of American units, causing a lack of cohesion and forcing constant re-learning of local terrain and population features. Many NATO countries subscribe to the notion that reconstruction and development will make the Taliban and al-Qaeda irrelevant, but neither is possible without first providing security for the population.

In Pakistan, the ruling government is increasingly fragile as President Pervez Musharraf steadily loses his grip on power and opposition figures struggle with each other for primacy. The assassination of Benazir Bhutto demonstrated the ability of Islamist radicals to move freely within Pakistani society and to cause chaos and fear among the population. The United States is becoming increasingly aggressive in targeting militants on Pakistani soil because the minimal effort previously put forth by Islamabad is quickly fading away. Simply put, Pakistan cannot be relied on to be a consistent and dependable ally in the war on terror.

So what should the United States do to head off a disaster in Afghanistan?

The first step has already been taken. The nomination of General David Petraeus last month to succeed Admiral William Fallon as the commander of CENTCOM, the combatant command responsible for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, was a long overdue recognition that the fight against the Taliban and al-Qaeda is far from over. Petraeus is considered by many in Washington to be America’s leading expert on counterinsurgency, in both theory and in practice. He is credited with successfully turning Iraq away from the disaster that would have accompanied full-scale civil war and his confirmation by the Senate will bring a fresh set of eyes to the Afghan problem.

Second, we have to inject American leadership into the overall effort in Afghanistan. That means increasing American force levels, as Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has already alluded to by mentioning the possible deployment of an additional 7,000 U.S. troops next year. The additional combat power mentioned by Gates would bring the total number of U.S. forces in Afghanistan to around 40,000. Injecting American leadership also means taking over command of forces battling the Taliban and al-Qaeda in the volatile south, another idea alluded to by Gates. Adding more American troops and taking over the fight in the south would make the overall effort in Afghanistan distinctly American.

Third, the United States should take whatever actions are necessary inside Pakistan to combat militant Islamists hindering our efforts in Afghanistan. Whether the Pakistani government is unwilling or unable to apply pressure to the tribal areas along the Afghan border is irrelevant. What matters is that militants cross the border freely and engage in attacks that kill coalition and government forces and Afghan civilians.

Finally, the United States should continue to put pressure on our NATO allies to remove restrictions on their forces, increase troop levels, and provide more economic and security force training assistance to the government of Hamid Karzai. Of course, this is more easily said than done, but it needs to be said nonetheless. European countries contributing to the fight in Afghanistan are faced with declining public support at home for continuing the war, defense budgets that have been in decline for years, and a significant capability shortfall that makes interoperability with American forces nearly impossible. Everyone recognizes that NATO is failing in Afghanistan, and the alliance is starting to fracture. These problems will not be fixed overnight. But they will also not be fixed without consistent and hard-nosed diplomatic pressure from both the President and the Congress.

Make no mistake about it. We are in danger of losing the war in Afghanistan. We have not lost it yet, but the danger of losing is real. We cannot sit around and wait for our allies in NATO or the government in Pakistan to do what they have promised. President Bush understands this and is taking steps now to make sure that Afghanistan does not once again become a failed state for terrorists to take advantage of.

I have to admit, I was as shocked as anybody when Democratic presidential contender Barack Obama said on Fox News Sunday that he was going to support the nomination of General David Petraeus as the commander of U.S. Central Command, the military’s combatant command responsible for one of the most volatile regions in the world. What’s going on here?

My initial reaction was one of confusion. Mr. Obama staunchly opposed the surge, while Petraeus, next to President Bush, was its biggest advocate. Mr. Obama wants to set a firm withdrawal date from Iraq, while General Petraeus has consistently argued that arbitrary timelines that ignore security conditions on the ground are foolish and make for bad military strategy. Mr. Obama wants to hold direct, unconditional talks with Iran, while General Petraeus repeatedly warns us that Tehran is responsible for arming and training elements within Iraq that are targeting and killing American soldiers.

In deciding to support Petraeus’ nomination, Senator Obama is attempting to show support for the military successes achieved under Petraeus while separating those successes from the political policies of the Bush administration. Truth be told, though, the two cannot be separated. President Bush, in his capacity as Commander in Chief of the armed forces, ordered the surge in American troops that largely reduced violence in Iraq and prevented a slide into full-blown civil war. General Petraeus, along with General Odierno (who is now slated to be Petraeus’ replacement in Iraq), were charged with executing the surge strategy. The results have been spectacular, with dramatic decreases in virtually every category tracked by the U.S. military: roadside bombs, indirect fire attacks, direct fire attacks, kidnappings, sectarian violence, U.S. casualties, Iraqi casualties, etc. And, despite many claims to the contrary, political progress in Baghdad is being made. It is excruciatingly slow, to be sure, but it is happening nonetheless. A separation of the man who gave the order from the execution and results of the order just cannot be done.

Petraeus is popular with the troops in Iraq, with the public at home, and with the Congress in Washington. To oppose him runs the risk of being labeled as one who refuses to recognize the good he has done in Iraq. So Senator Obama will support him, and will vote to confirm him as the next commander of CENTCOM. Then, if elected, he will ignore everything that General Petraeus has said and done in an attempt to satisfy the anti-war base element that brought him to the White House. My initial confusion was misplaced. The reality is that Mr. Obama cannot actively oppose Petraeus, even though he asserts he is opposed to everything the general believes.

The real question is whether he will follow through on his pledges of withdrawal and accept the likely consequences that will accompany a completely failed state in Iraq.

Reports surfaced over the weekend indicating that Iraqi cleric Moqtada al Sadr “clarified” his threat of open war by saying that his cease fire with the Maliki government was still in effect and that the members of his Mehdi Army militia would only attack U.S.-forces. How exactly he plans to execute this plan is somewhat of a mystery to this observer.

The problem is really quite simple to see. Iraqi Security Forces, with U.S. assistance, are continuing to target elements of the Mehdi Army in the Sadr City section of Baghdad, with heavy fighting reported over the weekend. How exactly is Sadr going to refrain from attacking Iraqi forces when those forces are increasingly mixed with U.S. units? Is Sadr going to restrain himself from responding with force if the Iraqi government sends its forces after his foot soldiers? Given the fact that U.S. and Iraqi forces are operating together and not independently of one another, the notion that Mehdi Army members will be able to execute Sadr’s orders is remote at best.

The reality is that this guy has been a thorn in the side of the U.S. since the invasion in 2003. I remember sitting in a TOC (Tactical Operations Center) at a base just outside Fallujah in the summer of that year discussing with other officers the problems Sadr was going to cause us. Our conclusion then was that something needed to be done about him. Now, “doing something” is nearly impossible given his continually rising popularity and the strength of his militia.

At this point I would argue that if we withdraw from Iraq too quickly, that is before the government in Baghdad is capable of defending itself from both internal and external threats, the likelihood of another dictator emerging from the chaos that would ensue is very real, and that new strongman could very well be Moqtada al Sadr. The cleric is not only known for opposing U.S. forces and for subverting the Maliki government. He also has taken a page from the playbook of the likes of Hamas and Hezbollah, who use the provision of basic services that the government is unable or unwilling to provide in order to gain “street credit” with the population.

By Greg C. Reeson

Former President Jimmy Carter raised more than a few eyebrows with his Middle East excursion for talks with leaders of the terrorist group Hamas. Many articles have been written about Carter’s motives, his hidden agenda, his bias against Israel, and his demonstrated distaste for all things Bush. And while it is understandable that many would be outraged by the fact that a former president would take it upon himself to undermine the current president by meeting with Hamas, Carter’s trip raises the bigger issue of whether or not we should negotiate with terrorists as a means for seeking peace in the Middle East.

One of the leading arguments for negotiating with terrorists is that no true peace can be achieved unless all interested parties are involved in political and violence-ending discussions. Carter himself has made this argument, saying that no lasting peace can be achieved between Israel and the Palestinians unless Hamas is part of the process. The problem, though, is that dealing directly with Hamas confers a sense of legitimacy to a terrorist organization that many, including this author, find inappropriate and unacceptable.

Of course, some would argue that legitimacy was granted to Hamas by virtue of the group’s victory in the 2006 Palestinian parliamentary elections. However, I would argue that Hamas’ electoral victory means only that the Palestinian people, and not the American people, are forced to deal with the group. Whether Hamas was elected in a free and fair manner, and therefore serves as the proper representative of the Palestinian people, is irrelevant. What matters is that Carter is asking Israel, and in essence, the United States, to sit down at the negotiating table with an organization that is committed to the destruction of the Jewish state and has used terrorist tactics to kill hundreds of people, including Americans, over the past two decades.

To understand the mindset of Hamas, one only has to read the words of the group’s foreign minister, Mahmoud al-Zahar, published in an opinion piece by the Washington Post this past week. In the article, Zahar lambastes the United States and Israel, and calls Carter’s trip “sensible.” He refers to the killings of innocent Israeli civilians as “resistance,” and lays out Hamas’ conditions for even beginning discussions with Israel: withdrawal to 1967 borders; dismantling of all Jewish settlements; complete Israeli withdrawals from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; an abandonment of Israeli claims to Jerusalem; a release of all Palestinian prisoners; and an end to the Israeli blockade of the Palestinian territories. Of course, there is no mention in the article about Hamas putting an end to the rockets that are pounding Israel on a daily basis, nor is there any mention of release for Corporal Gilad Shalit, an Israeli soldier held captive by Hamas since the summer of 2006. Instead, al-Zahar demands that Hamas be included in any political process without preconditions.

What Hamas has learned is that Israel and the West reward their use of violence and terrorist tactics. Israel has tried withdrawing from Palestinian areas before in exchange for promises of peace. Yet each time, reductions in the Israeli presence are met with more rockets, more kidnappings, and more suicide bombings. The United States condemns Hamas’ actions, but the United Nations can accomplish little more than resolutions critical of Israel’s “occupation” and imposition of economic sanctions against the Palestinians.

Another argument used by those in favor of negotiating with terrorists is that efforts should be made to support moderate actors while marginalizing the radicals within the group. This is considerably harder than it sounds. Moderates may be hesitant to come forward in an environment where hardliners dominate, and it is typically the radicals who are in control of groups that employ terrorist tactics. Besides, it is extremely difficult to talk to any member of a group that is attacking your country and your citizens, no matter how moderate some of its members may seem. Thus far, Hamas has failed to demonstrate its willingness to renounce violence in order to establish an environment conducive to negotiations for peace.

Negotiating with terrorists conveys a sense of weakness and tells terrorists everywhere that violent methods will at some point bring the West to the bargaining table. Communication with terrorists, through third parties such as regional allies, might be acceptable, but only to inform the terrorists that violence will not yield concessions. Communication is different than negotiation, and negotiation should not be an option until the violence has stopped.

Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert was completely justified in not meeting with Carter while the former president was traveling through Israel. Despite his insistence that the trip was a personal mission of peace, Carter is recognized and accepted in the region as a former president of the United States, a title that brings with it a sense of legitimacy and reward that no private individual could ever convey. By meeting with Hamas, Carter showed his complete contempt for the Israeli government, U.S. diplomatic efforts in the region, and President George W. Bush. And he did nothing to convince Hamas to lay down its arms and use its political clout for the betterment of the Palestinian people.

By Greg C. Reeson

In the March 27^th edition of The Economist, Adrian Wooldridge writes in “After Bush” that no matter who wins the White House in November, the next President will face three problems that President Bush has been forced to deal with over the past seven-plus years: 1) Partisanship in Washington; 2) Diverging views between the United States and the rest of the world on how best to confront radical Islam and the ongoing problems in the Middle East; and 3) Insufficient resourcing for the prosecution of a global war on terrorism, the defining effort of the Bush presidency and the driving force behind U.S. foreign policy since the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

With respect to partisanship, Wooldridge argues that the next President will have a difficult time bridging the gap between conservatives committed to fighting Islamic radicalism and liberals who think America’s response to the 9/11 attacks has been disproportionate and overblown. This is a very real problem, and it is one that will not go away anytime soon. Senator Obama has pledged to bring our troops home from Iraq immediately, and Senator Clinton has promised to begin a drawdown within her first two months as Commander-in-Chief. Senator McCain, on the other hand, has argued that American troops should stay in Iraq as long as it takes to secure American interests not only in Iraq, but in the region as well. No matter which candidate wins in November, the status quo is likely to continue, at least for a little while. Senator McCain has already made his intentions clear, and it is highly probable that either a President Obama or a President Clinton would take some time to evaluate the situation at hand, avoiding a rush to pull out of Iraq knowing that the responsibility for what follows would clearly belong to the new Commander-in-Chief. If McCain wins the White House, he will be attacked by the left and the Democratic Congress for continuing the war in Iraq, and he will be criticized by the right for tying the hands of the men and women doing the dirty work (closing Guantanamo, opposing waterboarding, etc.). If Obama or Clinton wins, they will leave conservatives hungering for more aggressive tactics in the war on terror while simultaneously angering liberals for failing to “bring the troops home” right away. The partisan divide will not be bridged, and no one will be satisfied.

Second, Wooldridge says, is the fact “…that America disagrees with the rest of the world over dealing with the Middle East and radical Islam.” I don’t necessarily buy into this line of thinking. First, conservative electoral victories in Europe have shifted two EU heavyweights toward a more pro-American posture. Germany under Chancellor Merkel and France under President Sarkozy have clearly shifted course and both are much more amenable to American ideas about the problems in the Middle East and the threat of radical Islam. Of course, there is still a long way to go in our relations with these countries, but we are clearly on the right path. Second, many of the governments in the Middle East are themselves threatened by Islamic extremists. So far, they have been willing to let us do most of the work. We will have to push these countries more aggressively, but given a choice between closer cooperation with the United States and being left to fend for themselves against the extremists, I suspect the decision will not be a difficult one.

Third, Wooldridge says, the United States is not providing sufficient resources for fighting the war on terror. The simple truth is that while our military men and women are at war, the nation is not. Most Americans go about their lives largely unaware that we are involved in a global effort to fight Islamic extremists whenever and wherever they may appear. The war is being fought not just in Afghanistan and Iraq, but in Africa, Asia, Europe, and the United States as well. It is a comprehensive effort that involves law enforcement, intelligence, and the military. But the country seems unaware. We cannot get critical equipment to the battlefield in a timely manner because the Congress drags its feet and because industry is not mobilized in support of the military. Federal agencies are still learning to work with each other instead of competing with each other. The Congress lets anti-terror legislation lapse and takes long breaks without addressing the needs of those fighting the battles. Americans, save those in the military and their families, are by and large not sacrificing in any meaningful way. Simply put, we aren’t acting like we’re a nation at war.

No matter what happens in November, the problems we face as a nation will remain very much the same. Partisanship will not abate, we will continue to disagree with European allies (though not as much as in the past), and we will continue to treat the war on terror as an annoyance that doesn’t require the full weight of American power to be brought to bear against it. None of that will change with the arrival of a new Commander-in-Chief.

By Greg C. Reeson

In mid-2006, the media was obsessed with the fact that the number of U.S. casualties in Iraq had reached 2,500, a number repeatedly referred to as a “grim milestone” and a “tragic benchmark.” By the end of that year, the casualty count had reached 3,000 and the headlines were once again full of catchphrases about the mounting cost in blood and treasure.  

Now, just about a quarter of the way through 2008, we have suffered our 4,000^th casualty in Iraq. As expected, the media seized the opportunity to run headlines expressing shock and anger at the death toll, and some presidential candidates reiterated their calls for immediate withdrawal of American forces. Of course, this morbid fascination will soon fade and the media’s attention will turn once again to the increasingly bitter Obama – Clinton nominating contest and the country’s ongoing economic woes. But for the soldiers who voluntarily put themselves in harm’s way, and for their families, the casualty count still matters, albeit in a very different way.  

The vast majority of the military men and women I know and associate with are cognizant of the death toll numbers for both Afghanistan and Iraq, although the former receives far less news coverage than the latter. But we choose not to focus on any particular number, milestone, or benchmark because we make no distinction between the first casualty, the 500^th casualty (which we will surpass in Afghanistan sometime in the coming weeks or months), and the 4,000^th casualty. The reason is simple: each fallen soldier is equally important and no one casualty carries more weight or is more significant than any other. Instead of worrying about what number we happen to be on, we choose instead to focus on each individual life and each sacrifice made. We respect and care for each other in life and in death, and we pay tribute to our lost in deeply personal ways that those who have not worn the uniform cannot fully understand or appreciate.

Arbitrary numbers serve but one purpose: they dehumanize the true cost of war by reducing individual lives to cold statistics that do not pay sufficient tribute to the incredible burdens being borne by our soldiers and their families. They’re great for headlines, but in reality they mean little. Personally, each time we lose a soldier, I’d like to see the network television stations and the major newspapers devote some time and space to telling the American public about the life that was given on their behalf. By better knowing those who have sacrificed themselves for us, we can better appreciate their service to this nation.

Two years ago, when we reached the 2,500 mark for soldiers killed in Iraq, a dear friend of mine was in the middle of his third deployment in support of the global war on terror. It was his second trip to Afghanistan, and it came much too soon after a year-long deployment to one of the worst areas in Iraq’s al-Anbar province. As I write this, he is on his second deployment to Iraq and his fourth overseas tour since 9/11, this time in a dangerous section of East Baghdad. I share this because I believe he is the perfect example of what Americans have come to love and respect about their men and women in uniform. He is the epitome of duty, honor, courage, and selfless service to the nation that our soldiers demonstrate day in and day out, in war and in peace. He has been decorated for valor and he has shed his blood for his country. At the end of his current tour in Iraq, he will have been separated from his wife and children for 40 of the 77 months that have passed since Operation Enduring Freedom began in October 2001. Yet he has never hesitated, not even for an instant, when his nation has called on him. And he is not unique. Rather, he is typical of those who decide to live their lives as American soldiers. After nearly two decades in uniform, I am still awestruck by the caliber and the character of the men and women with whom I am privileged to serve.

It is important that we as a nation understand the true cost of war. It is equally important that we understand the price this nation is paying is measured in individual lives lost, and not in arbitrary numbers chosen because they are mathematically round and are good for getting attention. I encourage everyone to go to the Department of Defense’s web site and sign up to receive DoD email press releases. Then anyone who wants to truly measure the cost of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq can read the almost daily casualty notifications, and in the process learn the names and hometowns of our fallen heroes and the names of the places where they gave their lives for their country. Because in the end, it is not the running total that matters, but the individual lives behind that running total that give us an appreciation for what it means to put service to the nation first, no matter the cost.

By Greg C. Reeson

You’ve heard them say it over and over again. Certain congressional leaders and presidential candidates repeating the mantra for audiences around the country: “Iraq is not part of the war on terror.” “The real terrorists are in Afghanistan.” “By going into Iraq, we took our eye off the ball.” But a new report, released last week from the Institute for Defense Analyses, reveals that Saddam Hussein’s Iraq was a leading state sponsor of regional and global terrorism, and that Saddam, at least indirectly, supported al Qaeda through associated terrorist groups.

After the report was released, most news organizations and some political pundits seized on one sentence from the report’s executive summary: “This study found no ‘smoking gun’ (i.e. direct connection) between Saddam’s Iraq and al Qaeda.” There are two important things to keep in mind, though. The first is that the war on terror goes far beyond bin Laden’s al Qaeda and Afghanistan. It is, in fact, a war on Islamic radicalism wherever it may exist in the world. Al Qaeda is but one group that uses terrorist tactics in the name of Islam, and al Qaeda is certainly not our only enemy. The second thing to keep in mind is that the lack of a “smoking gun” does not mean there was no association at all between al Qaeda and Saddam’s Iraq. Going beyond a simple reading of the executive summary and actually analyzing the contents of the report provides a different picture than that portrayed by the news media headlines.

The study, which was commissioned by the military’s Joint Forces Command, reviewed some 600,000 Iraqi documents captured after a U.S.-led coalition removed Saddam Hussein from power in 2003, finding multiple sources of evidence that indicated Saddam’s support for terrorism. Some of the groups listed as having received support from Iraq include Fatah-Revolutionary Council (the group of international terrorist Abu Nidal), Palestine Liberation Front, Force 17, Renewal and Jihad Organization, The Palestinian abd al-Bari al-Duwaik, Islamic Jihad Organization (Egyptian Islamic Jihad), Islamic Ulama Group, The Afghani Islamic Party, and Jam’iyat Ulama Pakistan.

The report cites a captured memorandum that details an agreement with Islamic terrorists to conduct operations against the Egyptian government, an ally of the United States, during Operation Desert Storm, with financial support to continue to the Islamists after the Gulf War was over. Then there is the document that tells us the top ten graduates of each Fedayeen Saddam class in 1999 were to be sent to London so as to be in position to conduct operations throughout Europe. Yet another memorandum concerning the establishment of a terrorist training camp in Sudan says, according to the study, “…Iraq would send one administrative officer to establish and oversee the camp and that the following equipment would be provided initially: 15,000 Kalashnikov 7.62mm rifles, 15,000 [SKS] rifles, 5,000 Browning pistols, 5,000 Markarov pistols….” Let’s not forget that Osama bin Laden was active in Sudan in the 1990s.

A memorandum from Saddam’s presidential secretary to the Revolutionary Council in 1993, a time when bin Laden claims his henchmen were attacking U.S. forces in Mogadishu, Somalia, details Saddam’s interest in establishing “…a group to start hunting Americans present on Arab soil; especially Somalia.” Then there’s an article by Stephen Hayes in this week’s issue of The Weekly Standard that cites other captured Iraqi documents, since verified by the U.S. government, that were not included in the study. One of these documents, Hayes writes, “…describes Osama bin Laden as an Iraqi intelligence asset ‘in good contact’ with Saddam’s intelligence assets in Syria. Another, says Hayes, was examined by a Pentagon and intelligence working group that concluded the document not only corroborated, but expanded on, other sources of evidence detailing contact between Saddam’s Iraq and bin Laden’s al Qaeda.

It is non unrealistic to conclude, given Saddam’s interest in Somalia and Sudan, both places associated with bin Laden, that even if there was no direct connection, Saddam and bin Laden were operating in the same areas at about the same times, and that there was likely some form of contact between their operatives. For those who argue that bin Laden, a radical Islamist, would never cooperate with Saddam, a secularist of the type al Qaeda sought to destroy, the just released report says “Common interests, even without common cause, increased the aggregate terror threat.” It goes on to say, “Saddam supported groups that either associated directly with al Qaeda (such as the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, led at one time by bin Laden’s deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri) or that generally shared al Qaeda’s stated goals and objectives.”

There is no question that Iraq under Saddam Hussein was a state sponsor of regional and global terrorism. “Saddam nurtured this capability,” the report says, “with an infrastructure supporting (1) his own particular brand of state terrorism against internal and external threats, (2) the state sponsorship of suicide operations, and (3) organizational relationships and ‘outreach programs’ for terrorist groups.” The report goes on to conclude “Evidence that was uncovered and analyzed attests to the existence of a terrorist capability and a willingness to use it until the day Saddam was forced to flee Baghdad by Coalition forces.”

Vice President Dick Cheney last week defended the invasion of Iraq as part of the global war on terrorism launched by the United States after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. During an unannounced visit to Baghdad, Cheney said the 9/11 attacks led to the decision to take out Saddam Hussein’s regime. Critics who allege that Iraq is not part of the war on terror fail to realize that after 9/11, everything changed. The United States could no longer count on two ocean barriers to protect us from foreign attack at home. Playing defense ceased to be an option and the United States had to eliminate potential threats before they materialized in our own backyard. While there may not be a “smoking gun,” there is enough evidence available to link Iraq to regions used by al Qaeda at times when al Qaeda was present. There is also enough evidence available to link Iraq to groups that shared al Qaeda’s vision and groups that directly supported or aided al Qaeda.

Of course, when all is said and done, there will be no shortage of those choosing to stick to the “Bush lied” mantra when talking about Saddam’s links to al Qaeda and the war on terror, no matter what reports like the one produced by the Institute for Defense Analyses tell us. Personally, having only read the first volume of the study so far, I am looking forward to what I will learn from the remaining four.

According to a statement posted on her Senate web site yesterday, Hillary Clinton is asking the Senate Armed Services Committee to conduct hearings into the resignation of Admiral William Fallon, who has been serving as the commanding officer of U.S. Central Command for just more than a year. The problem with her statement, and with her letter to Senator Levin, is that Mrs. Clinton is implying there should be limits on the President’s authority as Commander-in-Chief, limits I doubt she would impose on herself if she were to win the White House in November.

Expressing her concern over Admiral Fallon’s resignation, Senator Clinton said in her letter to committee chair Carl Levin of Michigan, “As you know, Admiral Fallon was a voice of reason in an administration which has used inflammatory rhetoric with respect to Iran, and I am deeply concerned by indications that Admiral Fallon’s decision to resign may not have been his own.” She goes on to say, “I believe it is in the interest of both our military and the policy making process for flag officers to be able to express their professional, unfiltered advice to civilian leaders.”

I want to make a couple of important points here. First, Admiral Fallon could express his “voice of reason” as often as he wanted, to other military officers, to defense officials, and to the President, in private. In military circles, dissent is not only tolerated, it is encouraged, but in private. For a senior military officer to disagree with the Commander-in-Chief, in public, is simply unacceptable. To imply that Admiral Fallon should be allowed to openly air personal views that are in contradiction to the President’s policy is to imply support for insubordination and subversion. In the military, debate precedes a decision, with differing viewpoints argued and rebutted. But once a decision is made by the commander, or in this case once policy is decided on by the Commander-in-Chief (to keep all options open regarding Iran), it is the duty and responsibility of the uniformed officer to carry out that decision or policy. If he or she cannot do that for moral ethical reasons, it is the responsibility of the officer to resign.

Second, Senator Clinton said she was concerned that the decision to resign may not have been made by Admiral Fallon. So what? If Admiral Fallon was contradicting the policy of the President, and failed to resign on his own, it is perfectly reasonable, and legal, that he would be forced out of his position. After all, Admiral Fallon, like all military officers, serves at the pleasure of the President of the United States. He is appointed by the President and can be relieved of his duties by the President. Why is this a point of contention for Senator Clinton?

To allow a serving senior officer, responsible for U.S. military operations in the most volatile region in the world, to publicly disagree with or contradict stated U.S. policy as expressed by the Commander-in-Chief is to undermine the basic principle of civilian control of our military. I seriously doubt that Senator Clinton would stand for such expressions of disagreement or contradiction by a sitting flag officer if she were to hold the title of Commander-in-Chief.

By Greg C. Reeson

On Sunday, March 2, Russian voters went to the polls and overwhelmingly elected First Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev to succeed Vladimir Putin as president of Russia. Of course, the election was a farce by western standards. Medvedev was handpicked for the presidency by Putin, faced no substantive opposition, and benefited from state support that essentially guaranteed he would defeat the three pro-Kremlin candidates opposing him. There were no debates, state-controlled media promoted Medvedev, government restrictions prevented meaningful international observation, and charges of electoral fraud were rampant before, during, and after the polling took place.

But now that the election is over, the question remains: who will run Russia after Medvedev’s inauguration on May 7, and what course will Russia pursue?  

Shortly after being selected for the presidency by Putin, Medvedev indicated that he would return the favor and name his predecessor Russia’s prime minister, the number two spot in the Russian government. Putin will, of course, accept the posting, and will use the time between now and May to shift real power from the president to the prime minister. No one inside or outside of Russia really expects Putin to accept a diminished role and play second fiddle to the newly elected president.  

With Putin still calling the shots, Russia will likely maintain its current path in both domestic and foreign affairs. That path under Putin has seen a steady withdrawal from the modest democratic gains that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union, the use of energy as a weapon, an increasingly advanced and aggressive military, and an anti-western (really, anti-American) approach to international relations.

On the democratic front, Putin has steadily increased state control of the political process, the economy, the media, and the Russian legal system. In Russia, once again, the state rules the day, while the citizen takes a back seat. Under Putin, Russia has used energy resources to coerce former Soviet states and to send messages to Europe about Russia’s ability to influence world events. The use of energy as a weapon most recently occurred just this week, with Russia cutting natural gas supplies to Ukraine twice in the past few days. While Russia claims the cuts are for financial reasons, it is more likely that Russia is attempting to keep Ukraine in check in response to repeated Ukrainian overtures to NATO and Europe.

Militarily, Russia has pursued more advanced war fighting equipment and weapons platforms and has pushed hard to extend the reach of the Russian military, resuming the Cold War practice of long-range bomber flights into areas controlled by the west for the last two decades. Internationally, Putin’s Russia has sided with Serbia in opposition to Kosovo’s independence, adamantly opposed U.S. ballistic missile defense systems in Poland and the Czech Republic, and thwarted western efforts at the United Nations to impose meaningful sanctions against a defiant Iran determined to continue its suspect nuclear program.

Nothing Russia has done, or not done, will change with Medvedev’s assumption of the presidency. That is because everything Russia has done, or not done, has been in pursuit of a singular national goal: the return of Russia to great power status. And with the United States bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan and increasingly worried about a growing Chinese military capability, the path is clear for Russia to continue its march toward regaining the power, prestige, and influence it once enjoyed.

All of this is fine with the Russian people, who generally support Putin and his policies. Since oil prices began their steady climb about four years ago, the Russian people have experienced greater access to everyday goods, an improved quality of life, and a renewed sense of national pride led by Putin. The status quo of the past few years has been good for the Russians, and neither they, nor Putin and Medvedev, are likely to change course anytime soon.

So what is the United States to do? To begin, we have to understand that Russia under Vladimir Putin is not going to be our ally or our friend, at least not in the traditional sense. Russia under Vladimir Putin will more often than not be an adversary that increasingly looks like the former Soviet Union. We will share common concerns, such as transnational terrorism and nuclear proliferation, but we will also have significant differences of opinion about such matters as independence for certain breakaway provinces and control over traditional spheres of influence.

Recognizing that Russia is not a democratic nation interested in working with the United States for a more stable, peaceful world, but is in fact an increasingly authoritarian state driven by a desire for international power and stature will allow us to formulate a strategy that seeks to limit Russian influence while advancing our national interests. Russia is highly dependent on the energy market, and vulnerabilities which can be exploited do exist. Russia has influence with Iran and with several former Soviet republics, and is a veto-holding member of the UN Security Council. In other words, there is room to maneuver and negotiate.

We must recognize Russia’s strengths and weaknesses, and our own capabilities and limits, and develop a way forward that allows us to deal with an increasingly powerful Russia. The time to formulate that strategy is now, even while we are occupied with the war on terror and a rising China, and before we find ourselves facing a replenished Russian military advancing Soviet-style interests in critical areas around the world.

In the introduction to Strategic Forecasting’s 2008 forecast, Dr. George Friedman writes that “…the U.S.-jihadist war is entering its final phase,” and that “…the destruction of al Qaeda’s strategic capabilities now allows the United States to shift its posture…and enables Washington to begin drawing down its Middle Eastern forces.” He could not be more wrong.

To begin, we are not fighting a “jihadist” war. We are fighting a global war on terrorism that involves the use of all the elements of national power: diplomatic, informational, military, and economic. Our fight is not just with the “jihadists” in the Middle East, but with those individuals worldwide that resort to terrorist tactics in pursuit of their political objectives. They could be Basque separatists in Spain, Taliban elements in Pakistan, or the Irish Republican Army in the United Kingdom. They could be Chechens operating from Georgian territory, Islamic fighters in the Philippines, or Kurdish rebels attacking Turkey from safe havens in northern Iraq. The notion that the U.S. effort against perpetrators of terrorism is entering its final phase is misguided, as is the belief that American forces will begin significantly drawing down troop levels in the Middle East.

The United States has already begun to redeploy some forces from Iraq, with one brigade that is not being replaced already at home and four more scheduled to come home without replacement by the summer. But the reality is that we will maintain far in excess of 100,000 troops there for the foreseeable future. The security gains achieved with additional troops and changed tactics could easily be lost if too many American forces are withdrawn before Iraqi forces are capable of stepping in for them. Political accommodation has begun at the local level in Iraq, but an outside arbiter of peace will be required for years to ensure that the country does not slide back toward civil war.

In Afghanistan, commanders on the ground have requested additional forces to prepare for an expected spring offensive by the Taliban and al Qaeda remnants. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates is considering the request, and the 24^th Marine Expeditionary Unit is packing its bags in preparation. The Afghan government is fragile, the army is making incremental progress, and U.S. and NATO forces will be around for a very long time. In South Asia, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf is barely holding on since the assassination of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, and Islamic extremists are doing their best to foment violence and unrest that could push a critical ally in the war on terror toward complete collapse.

The United States is assisting the Philippines in its ongoing battles with Abu Sayyaf, the Moro National Liberation Front, and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. We are in the process of getting AFRICOM, our newest combatant command, up and running to deal with threats in Africa like the Islamic Courts Union in Somalia and al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. Hamas and Hezbollah threaten a key ally, Israel, and Syrian terrorist tactics endanger a fragile democracy in Lebanon.

But it’s not just Islamists that are responsible for terror. The FARC in Columbia, the IRA in Northern Ireland, the Maoist Shining Path and Tupac Amaru in Peru, militias in the United States, and too many others to mention all pose a threat, and all must be dealt with. How we deal with these groups and the threats they pose involves much more than the involvement of U.S. military forces in Iraq or the Middle East.

We use diplomatic relations with other states to strengthen our intelligence and law enforcement capabilities, to support our allies, and to deter our foes. We use the media and our presence around the world to provide information about America’s support for democratic rule and opposition to tyrants who sponsor ruthless attacks on innocent civilians. We employ military action when necessary, and use the strength of the American economy to reward those who engage us peacefully and punish those who do not.

Al Qaeda has been dealt a severe blow, but the United States will maintain a large military presence in the Middle East for years to come. And our efforts to fight terrorism will continue around the world. The U.S. is not in a “jihadist” war, but a global war on terror that involves all the elements and instruments of power available to us as a nation. And because there will always be some in the world who feel desperate enough to resort to violence in order to make political gains, it will be a war without end.

The “surge” strategy adopted by President Bush in Iraq is now one year old, and despite the stunning successes achieved over the past several months some members of Congress still insist the introduction of additional combat forces into the fight has been a failure.

Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid of Nevada said a couple of days ago, “No amount of White House spin can hide the fact that the escalation’s chief objective of political reconciliation remains unmet, Iraqis have not demonstrated any readiness to stand up and take responsibility for their own country, and 2007 was the most lethal year yet for American troops.”

I’d like to address the Senator’s points, but in reverse order.

It is true, from a purely statistical point of view, that 2007 was the most lethal year yet for our military personnel serving in Iraq. But when Senator Reid focuses solely on the total number of U.S. casualties for the year, he ignores the fact that the number of wounded and dead troops dropped drastically in the last four months of the year. It is no coincidence that the casualty rate began to decline substantially after the last of the surge troops arrived and began offensive operations designed to secure the population and take the fight to the enemy. The fact that full employment of the additional forces did not occur until July underscores the amazing successes achieved between September and the end of the year. The casualty rate for U.S. forces, and for Iraqis, dropped more with each passing month.

Senator Reid says that Iraqis have not demonstrated any readiness to stand up and take responsibility for their country. Perhaps he is unaware of the increasing numbers of Concerned Local Citizens groups that are stepping up to the plate to take back their neighborhoods and towns, one at a time. Perhaps he is unaware that it was Iraqis who got fed up with al-Qaeda terrorists in al-Anbar Province and began to fight back. Perhaps he is unaware that the brave Iraqis who come forward to serve in the nation’s security forces are suffering three times the number of casualties that U.S. and coalition forces are enduring. Perhaps he is unaware that the number of citizen-provided intelligence tips has skyrocketed since some semblance of order has been returned to Iraq, and that the number of Iraqis providing information to coalition forces and the Iraqi government continues to increase as the population feels more safe and secure. To discount the fact that ordinary Iraqis are taking control of their country, at great cost to themselves, city-by-city and province-by-province is both irresponsible and reprehensible.

Finally, Senator Reid says that the surge’s primary purpose, that of political reconciliation, has not yet been achieved. The statement reveals a singular focus on the al-Maliki government, which is admittedly dysfunctional, rife with corruption, divided by sectarian loyalties, and grossly incompetent. While it is unlikely that the central government in Baghdad will serve as an example for the rest of Iraq, it is completely dishonest to not take into account the political reconciliation that is happening at the local level throughout the country. What everyone wishes for in Baghdad is quickly becoming the reality on the ground. Does it matter how we get there as long as we achieve the desired end state? If Baghdad can’t or won’t act, what’s wrong with forcing change from the bottom up?

Iraq is not yet won, and there is still a long way to go before U.S. troops can significantly reduce their numbers. But we are making progress, and so are the Iraqi people. They are fighting back against the extremist tactics of al-Qaeda, the number of violent attacks throughout the country has sharply declined, U.S. and Iraqi casualties are significantly lower over the past four months, oil production is getting better, markets are returning, and half of Iraq’s provinces are now under Iraqi control for security operations.

The surge, along with local reconciliation, the Sunni Awakening, and the decision by al-Sadr to stop his death squads, has had a significant positive effect on the security situation in Iraq that is making daily life better for ordinary Iraqis, even if the al-Maliki government continues to flounder. The surge cannot, by any definition, be called a failure.

It is, of course, impossible to know for sure what dangers the United States will face in 2008. Russian aggressiveness, Chinese military investment, Pakistani instability, and the ongoing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are obvious threats that need to be addressed, but the security problems faced by the American government go far beyond the obvious. Danger lurks everywhere, and 2008 promises to challenge us with threats both new and old.

The Middle East, which has presented the United States with challenges to its security since the conclusion of World War II, is a good place to start. And with the security situation in Iraq growing better each day, no country in the Middle East demands more American attention right now than Iran.

Iran has done its very best to live up to its status as a charter member of President Bush’s “axis of evil.” While the recent National Intelligence Estimate surmised that Tehran had halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003, no doubt in part because American troops were a little too close for comfort in neighboring Iraq, the U.S. intelligence community could only say with “moderate confidence” that the program had not been restarted. According to the 2007 Terrorist Threat to the Homeland document produced by the National Intelligence Council, the term “moderate confidence” is used in situations where “…the information is interpreted in various ways, we have alternative views, or the information is credible and plausible but not corroborated sufficiently to warrant a higher level of confidence” (emphasis mine). In other words, they’re not really sure.

Even if Iran has not restarted its weapons program, though, the continued enrichment of uranium in open defiance of United Nations resolutions allows Tehran the ability to convert any civilian nuclear program to a weapons program with relatively little effort. Add to the nuclear issue continued meddling in Iraq, support for Hezbollah in Lebanon, pursuit of advanced military equipment from Russia, and aid to Hamas in the Palestinian territories, and you have an Iranian government that is acting recklessly and dangerously in a bid to become the dominant power in the Middle East. Iran poses a serious threat to the region, to the United States, and to the international community, and that threat cannot be discounted.

Iraq faces a critical year in 2008, one which will have serious implications for our national security. U.S. military forces will begin to draw down from the surge, creating the possibility of fragmentation into separate autonomous regions or even states if political progress is not realized soon. Political accommodation does not necessarily have to start in Baghdad, though, and signs are already emerging that indicate local and provincial governmental bodies are moving forward where the Maliki government in Baghdad remains stalled.

Iraqi security forces are gaining competence and experience with each passing day, and their ability to take over security operations from U.S. forces will be critical to maintaining a unified Iraq. As American troops necessarily begin drawing down, it will be absolutely essential that conditions are created that allow Iraq to move forward without the need for U.S. military forces to return. Diplomatic engagement with Iraq’s neighbors will be critical as well to prevent meddling by regional players eager to take advantage of the U.S. departure.

Afghanistan will continue to be a problem for the United States, and it is possible that additional American military forces will be needed to boost a substandard NATO effort. Only a concerted offensive push against remaining Taliban and al-Qaeda elements, with an easing of national restrictions on troop employment, together with a substantive reconstruction strategy and counter-drug plan will save Afghanistan from the complete collapse it is now facing.

In South Asia, Pakistan is our most immediate concern. The assassination of former Prime Minister and head of the Pakistan People’s Party Benazir Bhutto could lead political fragmentation, forcing President Pervez Musharraf to consolidate his hold on power to prevent all-out civil war. Parliamentary elections scheduled for January 8 will likely be postponed as Musharraf attempts to crack down on the rising extremist threat that Pakistan faces. So far it appears that Musharraf has the support of the military establishment, backing that will be critical to shoring up a weak government that could threaten India and cooperation with the United States in its war against terror in Afghanistan. Musharraf himself is not as important to the United States as is a stable Pakistani government that supports democratic principles and the rule of law.

China will become increasingly important to U.S. national security interests in 2008, and it will be critical to look past the façade China will put up for the Beijing Olympics and focus our efforts on continued abuses of human rights, increasing investment in military capabilities, and looming economic problems that could affect the United States. China is probably the greatest long-term threat to America, and the Taiwanese presidential election scheduled for March could severely strain relations if Taiwan continues to push for independence from the mainland. China could, and should, figure prominently in U.S. negotiations with North Korea. While some progress was made last year, North Korea will take advantage of U.S. commitments elsewhere to trade nuclear concessions over time for guarantees of regime survival. Newly elected South Korean President Lee Myung-Bak has expressed a desire to work with North Korea and to invest in the North’s economy, no doubt an attempt to ease the massive financial burden that will accompany a North Korean implosion. Stability on the Korean peninsula is important to the United States, and desires for a nuclear-free North will have to be balanced against the consequences of governmental collapse.

In Russia, Vladimir Putin will leave the presidency and take up the role of prime minister. He is extremely popular with the citizenry, having moved Russia from the dark days following the collapse of the Soviet Union to a resurgent world power exerting its influence in the Caucasus, the Middle East, and in its diplomatic efforts at the United Nations. Russians once again see themselves as a great power, and Putin feels emboldened to continue his move away from democracy and toward autocratic control. Russia will in the coming year continue to oppose American efforts on its periphery, and will likely continue to back Serbia’s claim to the Kosovo Province. A unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo could spell disaster for U.S.-Russian relations, and could lead to a new round of bloodshed in the region. Russian aggressiveness will continue, and Putin will fight the United States on ballistic missile defense, Iran, the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, and NATO expansion.

Africa will continue to present significant challenges for the United States, with continuing conflict in Somalia, Darfur (and across Sudan), the Congo, and Uganda. The establishment of a new U.S. military combatant command, AFRICOM, should facilitate more significant American engagement on the continent. Military training for African nations, maritime security, economic development, and counterterrorism will be crucial to the future of what is fast becoming a security nightmare for the rest of the world.

In Latin America, Hugo Chavez will continue to oppose all things American, and his pursuit of foreign military equipment presents a major security threat to the region and to the United States. There is the potential for an arms race in our backyard while criminal elements and drug traffickers threaten the Southern U.S. border. 2008 could be a pivotal year for Cuba, especially if Fidel Castro fails to survive the next several months. In the event of Castro’s death, his brother Raul is likely to crack down on dissent in an effort to hold on to power, although his efforts will probably prove to be futile. The United States may well have to confront a governmental collapse in Cuba this year, and a strategy that involves key regional players will be critical for handling the demise of the Castros.

The next twelve months will be fraught with peril for the United States, and eyes around the world will be focused on the run-up to the November presidential election. Some states will take advantage of the uncertainty in America to jockey for position both regionally and internationally, while others will sit quietly and wait to see what happens. Foreign policy should be a determining factor in the election, and both our friends and our foes will be watching to see which candidate emerges victorious. This election is one of the most critical U.S. presidential contests in decades, and our choice will be critical to American standing in the world.